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	<title>&#45; CircleID</title>
	<link>https://www.circleid.com/blogs/</link>
	<description>Postings from  on CircleID</description>
	<dc:language>en</dc:language>
	<dc:rights>Copyright 2026, unless where otherwise noted.</dc:rights>
	<dc:date>2026-03-31T21:29:00+00:00</dc:date>

	
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		<title> (DNS) Security Protocols Do What They Say on the Tin (Featured Blog)</title>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://circleid.com/posts20180914_dns_security_protocols_do_what_they_say_on_the_tin</guid>
		<link>https://circleid.com/posts20180914_dns_security_protocols_do_what_they_say_on_the_tin</link>
		<description><![CDATA[DNS-over-TLS has recently become a welcome addition to the range of security protocols supported by DNS. It joins TSIG, SIG(0) and DNSSEC to add privacy, and, in the absence of validating stub resolvers, necessary data integrity on the link between a full-service resolver and the users' stub resolver. (The authenticated source feature of TLS may also offer some additional benefits for those of a nervous disposition.) Good stuff. What is not good stuff is... <a href="https://circleid.com/posts20180914_dns_security_protocols_do_what_they_say_on_the_tin">More...</a>]]></description>
		<dc:date>2026-03-31T14:29:00-07:00</dc:date>
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	<item>
		<title> DNSSEC Adds Value? (Featured Blog)</title>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://circleid.com/posts852611_dnssec_adds_value</guid>
		<link>https://circleid.com/posts852611_dnssec_adds_value</link>
		<description><![CDATA[The recent <a href="http://www.circleid.com/posts/arpa_org_and_uk_adopting_dnssec/">news</a> that .uk, .arpa and .org may sign their zones sometime this year is indeed good news. Each domain is highly significant... As the DNSSEC registry infrastructure moves inexorably forward -- primarily driven by top level pressure and considerations of National Interest -- it now behoves us to clearly articulate the benefits of DNSSEC to domain owners and registrars. In particular I want to focus on the vast majority of us to whom cold, hard cash is important and parting with it requires as a minimum tangible benefits or, in extreme cases, surgical intervention. <a href="https://circleid.com/posts852611_dnssec_adds_value">More...</a>]]></description>
		<dc:date>2026-03-31T14:29:00-07:00</dc:date>
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		<title> The Case Against DNSSEC (Featured Blog)</title>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://circleid.com/posts070814_case_against_dnssec</guid>
		<link>https://circleid.com/posts070814_case_against_dnssec</link>
		<description><![CDATA[I was talking to my good friend Verner Entwhistle the other day when he suddenly turned to me and said "I don't think we need DNSSEC". Sharp intake of breath. Transpired after a long and involved discussion his case boiled down to four points: 1. SSL provides known and trusted security, DNSSEC is superfluous, 2. DNSSEC is complex and potentially prone to errors, 3. DNSSEC makes DoS attacks worse, 4. DNSSEC does not solve the last mile problem. Let's take them one at a time... <a href="https://circleid.com/posts070814_case_against_dnssec">More...</a>]]></description>
		<dc:date>2026-03-31T14:29:00-07:00</dc:date>
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	<item>
		<title> Commercial DNSSEC? (Featured Blog)</title>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://circleid.com/postscommercial_dnssec</guid>
		<link>https://circleid.com/postscommercial_dnssec</link>
		<description><![CDATA[Seems that DNSSEC is being subjected to what an old boss of mine used to call the "fatal flaw seeking missiles" which try to explain the technical reasons that DNSSEC is not being implemented. First it was zone walking, then the complexity of Proof of Non-Existence (PNE), next week ... one shudders to think. While there is still some modest technical work outstanding on DNSSEC, NSEC3 and the mechanics of key rollover being examples, that work, of itself, does not explain the stunning lack of implementation or aggressive planning being undertaken within the DNS community. <a href="https://circleid.com/postscommercial_dnssec">More...</a>]]></description>
		<dc:date>2026-03-31T14:29:00-07:00</dc:date>
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