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	<title>&#45; CircleID</title>
	<link>https://www.circleid.com/blogs/</link>
	<description>Postings from  on CircleID</description>
	<dc:language>en</dc:language>
	<dc:rights>Copyright 2026, unless where otherwise noted.</dc:rights>
	<dc:date>2026-03-31T21:29:00+00:00</dc:date>

	
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		<title> Intelligence Exchange in a Free Market Economy (Featured Blog)</title>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://circleid.com/posts20130611_intelligence_exchange_in_a_free_market_economy</guid>
		<link>https://circleid.com/posts20130611_intelligence_exchange_in_a_free_market_economy</link>
		<description><![CDATA[The U.S. Government is causing a huge disservice to protection and defense in the private sector (80%+ of CIKR) by creating an ECS that contains monetary incentive for a few large players to exert undue control over the availability, distribution, and cost of security threat indicators. While there may be a legitimate need for the federal government to share classified indicators to entities for protecting critical infrastructure, the over-classification of indicator data is a widely recognized issue that presents real problems for the private sector. ECS as currently construed creates monetary incentives for continued or even expanded over-classification. <a href="https://circleid.com/posts20130611_intelligence_exchange_in_a_free_market_economy">More...</a>]]></description>
		<dc:date>2026-03-31T14:29:00-07:00</dc:date>
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