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	<title>&#45; CircleID</title>
	<link>https://www.circleid.com/blogs/</link>
	<description>Postings from  on CircleID</description>
	<dc:language>en</dc:language>
	<dc:rights>Copyright 2026, unless where otherwise noted.</dc:rights>
	<dc:date>2026-03-31T21:29:00+00:00</dc:date>

	
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		<title> VeriSign's New Security Seal Too Trusting? (Featured Blog)</title>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://circleid.com/postsverisigns_new_security_seal_too_trusting</guid>
		<link>https://circleid.com/postsverisigns_new_security_seal_too_trusting</link>
		<description><![CDATA[On November 4, 2003, VeriSign announced a new "trust enhancing" seal which they built using Macromedia's Flash technology...While there are problems inherent to VeriSign's approach that call into question their understanding of "The Value of Trust," there are ways they could have made this particular implementation less trivially spoofable. The flaws I demonstrate on this page are flaws in the concept and the execution rather than anything inherently flawed in Flash. Overall this kind of graphical "trustmark" is extremely easy to forge just by recreating the artwork. But in this case, you don't even have to do that. The seal can still be called directly off the VeriSign servers, yet it is easily modified, without recreating artwork, and without doing anything untoward with VeriSign's servers! <a href="https://circleid.com/postsverisigns_new_security_seal_too_trusting">More...</a>]]></description>
		<dc:date>2026-03-31T14:29:00-07:00</dc:date>
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