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	<title>&#45; CircleID</title>
	<link>https://www.circleid.com/blogs/</link>
	<description>Postings from  on CircleID</description>
	<dc:language>en</dc:language>
	<dc:rights>Copyright 2026, unless where otherwise noted.</dc:rights>
	<dc:date>2026-04-30T19:14:00+00:00</dc:date>

	
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		<title> Can Legislatures Safely Vote by Internet? (Featured Blog)</title>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://circleid.com/posts20200410-can-legislatures-safely-vote-by-internet</guid>
		<link>https://circleid.com/posts20200410-can-legislatures-safely-vote-by-internet</link>
		<description><![CDATA[It is a well understood scientific fact that Internet voting in public elections is not securable: "the Internet should not be used for the return of marked ballots. ... [N]o known technology guarantees the secrecy, security, and verifiability of a marked ballot transmitted over the Internet." But can legislatures (city councils, county boards, or the U.S. Congress) safely vote by Internet? Perhaps they can. To understand why, let's examine two important differences between legislature votes and public elections. <a href="https://circleid.com/posts20200410-can-legislatures-safely-vote-by-internet">More...</a>]]></description>
		<dc:date>2026-04-30T12:14:00-07:00</dc:date>
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		<title> Security Against Election Hacking - Part 2: Cyberoffense Is Not the Best Cyberdefense! (Featured Blog)</title>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://circleid.com/posts20160818_security_against_election_hacking_part_2_cyberoffense_not_cyberdef</guid>
		<link>https://circleid.com/posts20160818_security_against_election_hacking_part_2_cyberoffense_not_cyberdef</link>
		<description><![CDATA[State and county election officials across the country employ thousands of computers in election administration, most of them are connected (from time to time) to the internet (or exchange data cartridges with machines that are connected). In my previous post I explained how we must audit elections independently of the computers, so we can trust the results even if the computers are hacked. <a href="https://circleid.com/posts20160818_security_against_election_hacking_part_2_cyberoffense_not_cyberdef">More...</a>]]></description>
		<dc:date>2026-04-30T12:14:00-07:00</dc:date>
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		<title> Security Against Election Hacking - Part 1: Software Independence (Featured Blog)</title>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">https://circleid.com/posts20160817_security_against_election_hacking_part_1_software_independence</guid>
		<link>https://circleid.com/posts20160817_security_against_election_hacking_part_1_software_independence</link>
		<description><![CDATA[There's been a lot of discussion of whether the November 2016 U.S. election can be hacked. Should the U.S. Government designate all the states' and counties' election computers as "critical cyber infrastructure" and prioritize the "cyberdefense" of these systems? Will it make any difference to activate those buzzwords with less than 3 months until the election? First, let me explain what can and can't be hacked. Election administrators use computers in (at least) three ways... <a href="https://circleid.com/posts20160817_security_against_election_hacking_part_1_software_independence">More...</a>]]></description>
		<dc:date>2026-04-30T12:14:00-07:00</dc:date>
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