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The Sunday Herald reported on Sunday that Best Western was struck by a trojan attack that lead to the possible compromise of about 8 million victims. There is some debate as to the extent of the breach and not a small amount of rumor going around. I’m not entirely disposed to trust corporate press releases for the facts, nor am I going to blindly accept claims of security researchers whose first call is to the PR team when discovering a problem.
That said, here is what seems to be the agreed upon facts:
Of course, PCI really only helps one piece of the security equation and compliance is not the same as security. In fact, it is usually (at best) a poor substitute and more often an excuse to stop thinking about security (“We’re Compliant!” followed by self-congratulatory back slapping). The same is true with relying on encryption. Encryption can be “defeated” and the ways to do it are well-known. (For instance, here is a paper I wrote almost 4 years ago on how to do it). If you can own the endpoint of a communication, encryption is irrelevant.
As another example, remember the backup tape heists a few years ago? Attackers know it takes an excessive amount of time to crack encryption, so they target ways to avoid it. Someone had the great idea of stealing backup tapes at which point few people would have even thought to have protected those. Now it is due diligence.
That said, here are 5 areas that are likely targets in the near future (or are targets now) that you may be overlooking:
Will put up more info on Best Western as the situation warrants. Thoughts to the top 5 lists? What would you add or take off?
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John, I agree with your assessment of likely new attack targets. At Configuresoft, we urge all of our customers to treat ECM systems as critical assets that require the highest levels of protection for this exact reason. Although it’s tough to completely prevent a privileged insider from doing damage if he/she wants to, locking down the configuration management server(s) using well-known and accepted hardening guidelines, using strong passwords for accessing the system, etc. are all things people should be doing for *any* sensitive data storage or control systems. I think it’s important to note, though, that simply hijacking an operating system does not automatically guarantee the execution of malicious commands or actions within a configuration, network, or patch management product, which usually require the input of additional credentials to access the actual application. It’s certainly a step along the way, obviously.
—Dave
Director, Configuresoft’s Center for Policy and Compliance