Bruce Van Nice

Bruce Van Nice


Joined on February 12, 2009
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Featured Blogs

DoT and DoH Guidance: Provisioning Resolvers

As part of a larger effort to make the internet more private, the IETF defined two protocols to encrypt DNS queries between clients (stub resolvers) and resolvers: DNS over TLS in RFC 7858 (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS in RFC 8484 (DoH). As with all new internet protocols, DoT and DoH will continue to evolve as deployment experience is gained, and they're applied to more use cases. more

DNS-Based DDoS: Diverse Options for Attackers

Denial of service attacks have been around since the Internet was commercialized and some of the largest attacks ever launched relied on DNS, making headlines. But every day a barrage of smaller DNS-based attacks take down targets and severely stress the DNS ecosystem. Although DNS servers are not usually the target of attacks they are often disrupted so attention from operation teams is required. There is no indication the problem is going away and attackers continue to innovate. more

DNS Amplification Attacks: Out of Sight, Out of Mind? (Part 3)

Previous posts (Part 1 and Part 2) offer background on DNS amplification attacks being observed around the world. These attacks continue to evolve. Early attacks focused on authoritative servers using "ANY" queries for domains that were well known to offer good amplification. Response Rate Limiting (RRL) was developed to respond to these early attacks. RRL, as the name suggests, is deployed on authoritative servers to rate limit responses to target names. more

DNS Amplification Attacks: Out of Sight, Out of Mind? (Part 2)

This post follows an earlier post about DNS amplification attacks being observed around the world. DNS Amplification Attacks are occurring regularly and even though they aren't generating headlines targets have to deal with floods of traffic and ISP infrastructure is needlessly stressed -- load balancers fail, network links get saturated, and servers get overloaded. And far more intense attacks can be launched at any time. more

DNS Amplification Attacks: Out of Sight, Out of Mind? (Part 1)

Geoff Huston's recent post about the rise of DNS amplification attacks offers excellent perspective on the issue. Major incidents like the Spamhaus attack Geoff mentions at the beginning of his post make headlines, but even small attacks create noticeable floods of traffic. These attacks are easy to launch and effective even with relatively modest resources and we see evidence they're occurring regularly. Although DNS servers are not usually the target of these attacks the increase in traffic and larger response sizes typically stress DNS infrastructure and require attention from operation teams. more

High Performance DNS Needs High Performance Security

There's been a lot of emphasis on DNS performance lately because faster DNS contributes directly to a better user experience. There's an interesting flipside to DNS performance though, higher performance DNS servers may be better targets for cache poisoning attacks. Faster servers give attackers more opportunities to insert fake entries into the DNS - speed can kill (or at least inflict a nasty wound!) so it's important to understand the security implications if you're looking to upgrade DNS performance. more

The Business Parallels Between IPv6 and DNSSEC

For two things that would seem to be completely unrelated there is an interesting parallel between IPv6 and DNSSEC. In both cases there is a misalignment of interests between content providers and service?providers. Content providers aren't highly motivated to deploy IPv6 because only a small proportion of users have v6 connectivity and even fewer only have v6. Service providers aren't anxious to deploy IPv6? because there isn't a lot of content on v6, and virtually none exclusively on v6 - so they don't expand the universe of interesting stuff on the web by deploying IPv6. Basically the same things could be said about DNSSEC. more

A Logical Place to Start the IPv6 Transition

The transition to IPv6 is top of mind for most service providers. Even in places where there are still IPv4 addresses to be had surveys we've run suggest v6 is solidly on the priority list. That's not to say everyone has the same strategy. Depending where you are in the world transition options are different -- in places such as APAC where exhaustion is at hand one of the many NAT alternatives will likely be deployed since getting a significant allocation of addresses is not going to happen and other alternatives for obtaining addresses will prove expensive. more

Spam from Mobile Networks? Who Woulda Thought…

Mobile networks aren't usually thought of as sources of spam, but a quick look at some of the resources that track spam reveals they actually are. This is counter intuitive at first glance because when most people think of mobile they think of smartphones, and those aren't known to be sources of spam (at least not yet). What's really going on is PCs connected to mobile networks with air cards, or tethered with a smartphone where it's permissible, are the culprits more

Driving DNSSEC: The Need for Integration of All the Functions Needed

DNSSEC continues to gain momentum as network operators and domain owners watch and learn from early adopters. The learning process is made easier by efforts such as the ongoing work conducted by researchers at Sandia labs to methodically identify and categorize the kinds of problems that are occurring. more

Is It Time to Supplement Desktop Security Protections?

Internet users are acutely aware of their exposure on the Internet and clearly concerned about their safety. Increased downloads of scareware as Conficker made headlines in the mainstream media are only the latest evidence. Desktop software is often viewed as a one-stop shop for fighting Internet threats such as viruses, worms and other forms of malware and phishing. These solutions have served us well but more protections are needed to address the dynamic and increasingly sophisticated web based exploits being launched... more