Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Chairman, Cramton Associates; Professor of Economics, University of Maryland
Joined on November 14, 2012
Total Post Views: 38,623

About

Peter Cramton is Chairman of Cramton Associates and Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland. Since 1983, he has conducted research on auction theory and practice. This research appears in the leading economics journals. The main focus is the design of auctions for many related items. Applications include spectrum auctions, electricity auctions, and treasury auctions. On the practical side, he is Chairman of Market Design Inc., an economics consultancy founded in 1995, focusing on the design of auction markets. He also is Founder and Chairman of Cramton Associates LLC, which since 1993 has provided expert advice on auctions and market design. Since 2001, he has played a lead role in the design and implementation of electricity auctions in France and Belgium, gas auctions in Germany, and the world’s first auction for greenhouse gas emissions held in the UK in 2002. He has advised numerous governments on market design and has advised dozens of bidders in high-stake auction markets. Since 1997, he has advised ISO New England on electricity market design and was a lead designer of New England’s forward capacity auction. He led the design of electricity and gas markets in Colombia, including the Firm Energy Market, the Forward Energy Market, and the Long-term Gas Market. Since June 2006, he played a leading role in the design and development of Ofcom’s spectrum auctions in the UK. He has advised the UK, the US, and Australia on greenhouse gas auction design. He led the development of the FAA’s airport slot auctions for the New York City airports. He received his B.S. in Engineering from Cornell University and his Ph.D. in Business from Stanford University.

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Featured Blogs

More on Private Auctions for New gTLDs

My recent post on private auctions for new gTLDs under contention generated many responses from applicants. Here I follow-up with answers to the questions raised... Many, but certainly not all, applicants have a strong motivation to participate in a private auction. This incentive is especially strong for domains for which the community, geographic, and other factors are not compelling. more

Rationale for New gTLD Applicant Auctions to Resolve String Contentions

As Ray King emphasized in his post on private auctions, "[m]ost importantly, let's get moving -- private auction makes business sense, provides clarity and speeds the process for everyone." In the "get moving" spirit, I wish to answer a number of questions that I am frequently asked about private auctions in general and the Applicant Auctions in particular. more

Making the Most of the Draw: The Applicant Auction Conference

Yes, it is a bit odd that applicants for top-level domains need to attend the Prioritization Draw in person on December 17. Jetting to LAX to observe a raffle may seem like a waste of time and money. But here is how to make the most of it. Attend the Applicant Auction Conference at the Marriott Santa Monica on December 18. more

Applicant Auction for Top-Level-Domains:? Resolving Contention Fairly, Efficiently & Transparently

The quest for new top-level domains took an important step last spring with 1,930 applications to ICANN. 755 of these applications, from 145 different parties, are under contention. ICANN has encouraged these applicants to resolve the contention among them, and has established a last-resort auction in the event agreements among applicants cannot be reached. Here I describe a private auction model, the Applicant Auction, which is an efficient, fair and transparent approach to resolve contentions. more