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A paper published by the Naval War College titled, “China’s Maxim – Leave No Access Point Unexploited: The Hidden Story of China Telecom’s BGP Hijacking,” accuses the Chinese government of manipulating BGP routing in order to intercept internet traffic. Doug Madory, Oracle’s Director of Internet Analysis, who was involved with the 2017 activities to stop the effort, says there is some truth to the paper’s assertion but does not claim to know the motivation behind the actions. He writes: “On 9 December 2015, SK Broadband (formerly Hanaro) experienced a brief routing leak lasting little more than a minute. During the incident, SK’s ASN, AS9318, announced over 300 Verizon routes that were picked up by OpenDNS’s BGPstream service ... Over the course of several months last year, I alerted Verizon and other Tier 1 carriers of the situation and, ultimately, Telia and GTT (the biggest carriers of these routes) put filters in place to ensure they would no longer accept Verizon routes from China Telecom.”
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