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Between 6 and 11 October 2026, we validated the DNSSEC chain of trust for 257 million domains across 1,077 gTLD zones, walking each one from the root trust anchor down to its own servers. Only 5.0 percent of them, about 12.9 million names, came back secure. The median gTLD did slightly better at 6.2 percent, and 195 gTLDs had fewer than 5 percent of their domains secure.
Low adoption is old news. What stands out in the data is where the secure domains are. They are not spread evenly across registrants who chose to sign. They sit almost entirely at a few DNS hosts that sign by default. At the hosts where signing is a setting the customer has to find and turn on, almost no one has turned it on.
We grouped every validated domain by the operator of its authoritative nameservers. The table shows eight of the large consumer and cloud DNS hosts, each with more than one million gTLD domains, and how many of each host’s domains validated as secure in that crawl.
| DNS host | Secure domains | Share of host’s domains |
|---|---|---|
| Google Cloud DNS | 3,329,220 | 34% |
| Spaceship | 2,705,540 | 89% |
| Squarespace | 1,030,612 | 97% |
| OVHcloud | 914,264 | 53% |
| Cloudflare | 896,016 | 2.3% |
| Wix | 890,215 | 16% |
| Namecheap | 143,106 | 1.6% |
| GoDaddy | 138,394 | 0.3% |
The two ends of the table could hardly be further apart. At Squarespace, 97 percent of domains are secure. At Spaceship, 89 percent are. At GoDaddy, which hosts DNS for 47.1 million gTLD domains, more than any other host in the table, 0.3 percent are.
Spaceship turns DNSSEC on by default for domains that use its nameservers. Squarespace, which acquired the Google Domains business in 2023, offers DNSSEC on its own nameservers. A 97 percent rate across a million domains is only reached when signing is the default. The hosts at the bottom of the table all support DNSSEC, but the customer has to ask for it. At Namecheap and Cloudflare, it is a free setting the customer has to switch on. At GoDaddy, each account gets a small number of free DNSSEC credits, one per domain, and further domains need more credits or Premium DNS. At Wix, DNSSEC is a paid add-on for domains registered through Wix. The results follow the defaults closely. Where signing happens unless the customer opts out, nearly every domain is signed. Where the customer has to opt in, few are: 16 percent at Wix, where it is a paid add-on, and under 3 percent at GoDaddy, Cloudflare and Namecheap.
The hosts in the middle of the table show the same effect. Google Cloud DNS, at 34 percent, groups more than one population behind the same nameserver names, including Cloud DNS managed zones, where DNSSEC is a per-zone option the customer enables. OVHcloud enables DNSSEC by default for domains registered with it, and stands at 53 percent. Its nameservers also serve domains registered elsewhere, where the DS record has to be added at the other registrar by hand, and that is a likely reason the rate is not higher. Neither figure says much about how registrants feel about DNSSEC. Both mostly show where a domain is registered and which product it is on.
These eight hosts together account for about 10.0 million of the 12.9 million secure gTLD domains, or roughly three-quarters of all DNSSEC-secure names in the gTLD space. Spaceship, Squarespace and Google alone account for more than half.
The concentration on the unsigned side is larger. GoDaddy, Cloudflare and Namecheap together host 39 percent of all validated gTLD domains, about 95 million names. Only 1.2 percent of those are secure.
The arithmetic follows from that. If those three hosts had Spaceship’s 89 percent rate, the number of secure gTLD domains would go from about 13 million to about 96 million. GoDaddy alone moving to that rate would more than quadruple the current total. No outreach campaign aimed at registrants has produced anything close to that, and none could, because most of these registrants will never open a DNS settings page.
This is consistent with what earlier work found. The 2017 USENIX Security study by Chung and colleagues showed that DNSSEC deployment problems in .com, .net and .org were concentrated at a small number of operators, including a Swedish hosting provider, Loopia, whose nameservers served DNSKEY records for more than 131,000 domains, only one of which had a DS record in the parent zone, and that one was invalid. Nine years later the population is larger and the operators are different, but adoption is still set by operators rather than by individual domain owners.
Opt-in DNSSEC asks the registrant to do three things. They have to know DNSSEC exists. They have to find the setting. And, when the DNS host and the registrar are different companies, they have to copy a DS record from one control panel to the other. Each step loses most of the people who reached it.
The third step is the hardest, and it is where the hosts differ most. When the same company is both registrar and DNS host, it can publish the DS record itself, and signing can be fully automatic. That is how Spaceship and Squarespace reach their numbers. Cloudflare hosts DNS for tens of millions of domains registered elsewhere. For those domains it can sign the zone, but it cannot put the DS record into the parent zone itself. Unless the registrar scans for CDS records, which few do, the registrant has to add the DS record by hand.
The standards to remove that step exist. With CDS and CDNSKEY records (RFC 7344, RFC 8078), the DNS host publishes the DS record it needs in the child zone and the parent picks it up. RFC 9615 adds a way to bootstrap that process securely for a zone that is not yet signed. RFC 10026 sets out best practice for automating DS provisioning end to end. Some ccTLD registries already act on CDS records. In the gTLDs, the DS still travels by hand in most cases.
Two changes, each in the hands of a small number of organizations, would do more for gTLD DNSSEC than another decade of awareness work.
The figures above come from one crawl, and they have limits that should be stated.
DNS hosts are identified by the names of their authoritative nameservers. That attributes white-label and reseller DNS to the platform that actually runs it, which is usually what matters for signing, but it means a “host” in the table is a nameserver platform and not necessarily one company’s customer base. Parking and registry-operated nameservers are counted separately and are not in the table.
The shares are measured against each host’s validated domains. Domains whose servers did not answer at all have no DNSSEC verdict and are excluded. A large registrar-host’s portfolio also includes many unused and parked domains. Those weigh down its secure share, but they are also the domains no one will ever opt in, which is exactly the case for changing the default.
The secure counts are verified chains: the DS in the parent matches a key the zone serves, and the signatures validate. A domain with DNSKEY records and no DS counts as insecure, because no validating resolver can tell it apart from an unsigned one.
The default settings described above come from each provider’s public documentation and our own observations of how its zones are configured. Defaults change, and some providers apply them differently by product or by TLD. The data shows the outcome. It cannot show every policy behind it.
DNSSEC has been available to gTLD registrants for more than fifteen years, and 95 percent of their domains still do not validate as secure. That is often put down to apathy or complexity at the registrant level. The host-level data points somewhere else. Registrants on platforms that sign by default are almost all signed, and registrants on platforms that do not mostly are not. The registrant’s choice has little to do with it.
That makes gTLD DNSSEC adoption a decision held by a handful of DNS hosts and the registries that sit above them. The per-host and per-TLD figures behind this article are published at audnsxplore.com/stats, and they are refreshed with every crawl of the gTLD namespace by AUDNSXplore, an ICANN Grant Program project.
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