A policy intended to combat sports piracy is leading a nonprofit cybersecurity provider to stop serving users in France. That outcome should concern anyone who wants both effective enforcement against copyright infringement and a safer Internet.

On October 22, Quad9 announced that it would withdraw its service from France on November 24 following a French court ruling concerning DNS blocking. Quad9 says the available approaches would conflict with its privacy commitments and service integrity, or extend the effects of a French decision to users elsewhere. Quad9 says its appeal of the French court ruling remains pending.

Quad9 provides a free DNS service that helps people reach Internet destinations while offering protection against malicious domains. Its planned departure means users who chose it will need a trustworthy alternative. That consequence must be weighed in the assessment of whether the current enforcement approach is succeeding.

At the Internet Infrastructure Coalition (i2Coalition), we have been examining precisely these kinds of consequences. We represent companies that build and operate the Internet’s infrastructure, including hosting and cloud providers, domain registrars and registries, VPN providers, and security companies.

Our members work at different technical layers, with different capabilities and responsibilities. That broad collective experience gives us a practical reason to ask whether a proposed intervention targets the right actor, can achieve its intended purpose, and preserves the legitimate services people depend on.

To make those questions more accessible beyond our industry, we are building Internet at Risk, a series of public policy education papers and accompanying online resources.

Quad9’s announcement illustrates why we believe this work is needed.

What DNS at Risk Warned About

The first paper in the series, DNS at Risk, examines the consequences of using the Domain Name System as an enforcement tool.

DNS helps translate names people use into addresses computers use. A recursive resolver performs that lookup on a user’s behalf. It generally does not host the website or control the material being sought.

Blocking an answer at a resolver therefore does not remove the underlying content. It restricts access through that resolver. That distinction is critical when evaluating effectiveness, collateral impact, and proportionality.

Our paper examines how infrastructure-level blocking can disrupt lawful activity, weaken security, and contribute to Internet fragmentation. Quad9’s planned withdrawal is a living example of the very consequences we warned policymakers to consider.

Copyright infringement causes real harm. But enforcement measures should be assessed against a provider’s actual role, its control over the infringing material, and the effectiveness and wider consequences of the proposed remedy. The technical ability to interrupt access does not, by itself, make a recursive DNS resolver the appropriate enforcement target.

We should also ask what happens after the intervention. Does it address the infringement? Does it displace activity to another service? Does it disrupt lawful activities of other users? Does it cause a responsible provider to withdraw, leaving legitimate users with fewer choices?

Why the Series Extends Beyond DNS

We did not stop with our DNS report because the policy pressures do not end there.

The second report, Encryption at Risk, examines efforts to weaken, circumvent or mandate access to encrypted systems, and the risks those interventions create for secure communications.

Our newest release, VPNs at Risk, looks at pressures on virtual private networks, tools used to protect online activity, support secure connections and preserve privacy. We presented its findings at this year’s Global Encryption Day Summit.

These technologies are distinct, and the papers address their differences. Bringing them into one series helps us identify and examine a recurring pattern: a proposed intervention focuses on a technology’s potential misuse while giving insufficient weight to its legitimate functions and the consequences of restricting it.

There is also an escalation problem. When activity remains reachable through another route, the limitations of one blocking measure can become the argument for extending restrictions to another service or layer. Each proposal may be presented as narrow, while the cumulative effect can be much broader.

That is the slippery slope we want policymakers to examine and avoid. It does not mean every further restriction is inevitable. It means the direction of travel deserves scrutiny before successive interventions become difficult to unwind.

A Public Resource That Develops With the Evidence

InternetAtRisk.org brings the DNS, encryption and VPN reports together.

We are building this educational resource for policymakers, journalists, researchers, and anyone who needs to understand how these technologies work and what is at stake when their operating conditions change. The individual papers explain the issues, while the website provides a shared place to explore the work and connect developments across subjects.

This is intended to be a living body of policy education. New cases should help us test and refine the analysis. We welcome evidence from operators, civil society, researchers, and policymakers, including evidence that challenges our conclusions.

Quad9’s announcement gives us a clear and immediate reason to continue our work: an enforcement dispute is producing a decision that will affect people who rely on a lawful security service.

We would rather help policymakers understand those consequences while they still have choices about how to proceed.