As announced on RIPE Labs we monitored the behaviour of a number of networks that participated in the World IPv6 Launch on 6 June 2012. For that, we looked at the full list of participating organisations as shown on the ISOC website and chose 50 websites from that list. We looked at 'interesting' sites and at geographic distribution. We also tried to find a good mix of networks that had IPv6 switched on already and those that didn't have IPv6 deployed at the time they registered on the ISOC web site.
Netflix has announced that they are deploying their own Content Delivery Network (CDN) for delivery of their video streams to Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) around the world. More importantly they are making the hardware and software design of their CDN servers freely available. That means any network can deploy Netflix CDN boxes deep into their network to significantly reduce traffic volumes and improve performance for users.
There has been a lot of discussion lately about the potential for IPv6 to create security issues. While there are definitely some security risks of IPv6 deployment, a carefully considered implementation plan can help mitigate against security risks. As we approach World IPv6 Launch tomorrow, I thought it prudent to share the below described incident that iDefense recently observed.
Here we go again; another instance of really sophisticated spyware has been reported, a system that is "so complex and sophisticated that it's probably an advanced cyber-weapon unleashed by a wealthy country to wage a protracted espionage campaign on Iran". I won't get into the debate about whether or not it's really more impressive than Stuxnet, whether or not it's groundbreaking, or whether or not Israel launched it; let it suffice to say that there are dissenting views. I'm more interested in the implications.
This year, we expect that the RIPE NCC's pool of unallocated IPv4 addresses will reach the "last /8", meaning that we have 16,777,216 IPv4 addresses left in the available pool. At that point it will no longer be possible for RIPE NCC members to obtain the amount of IPv4 addresses they will require to expand their current and future networks. When we hit the last /8, the RIPE NCC will only be able to distribute IPv6 addresses and a one-off allocation of IPv4 address space... Has this caused a last minute rush?
DNS blacklists for IPv4 addresses are now nearly 15 years old, and DNSBL operators have gathered a great deal of expertise running them. Over the next decade or two mail will probably move to IPv6. How will running IPv6 DNSBLs differ from IPv4? There aren't any significant IPv6 DNSBLs yet since there isn't significant unwanted IPv6 mail traffic yet (or significant wanted traffic, for that matter), but we can make some extrapolations from the IPv4 experience.
Talking technical is easy. Distilling technical detail, complex threats and operation nuances down to something that can be consumed by people whose responsibility for dealing with cybercrime lays three levels below them in their organizational hierarchy is somewhat more difficult. Since so many readers here have strong technical backgrounds and often face the task of educating upwards within their own organizations, I figured I'd share 4 slides from my recent presentation that may be helpful in communicating how the world has changed.
George Michaelson, APNIC's Senior Research and Development Scientist recently visited the RIPE NCC to collaborate on various research projects with his RIR colleagues. IPv6 measurements were one of the topics we looked at. Recent IPv6 statistics from the RIPE NCC show an accelerated uptake of IPv6 in Norway, both in terms of the number of allocated prefixes, and visible announcements in the routing system.
Communications will be one of the most critical areas during the London Olympic Games. The industry is working to establish shared access networks -- would it not be nice if they did this everywhere, all the time? They are also working very closely with British Olympic Association, London Transport, the broadcasters and content providers. Mobile coverage will be the biggest shared infrastructure in the world.
We continue to see consolidation in the broadband market and various games played by the cablecos and telcos to thwart competition or undermine network neutrality. Until regulators create true structural separation between infrastructure and service providers the chances of seeing genuine broadband competition are slim. It is interesting to note telecom regulators in North America have imposed structural separation in the past.