As chance has it, the attempt by NTIA to create a fake Trump Open 5G Security Framework MAGAverse as they headed out the door on 15 January is being followed this week by the global meeting of 3GPP SA3 (Security) to advance the industry’s real open 5G security Framework. Designated TSGS3-102e (the 102^nd meeting, occurring electronically), it continues the practice of assembling companies, organisations, and agencies from around the world every 8 to 12 weeks to focus on 5G security for current and future releases of 5G infrastructure. Compared to the NTIA exercise in MAGAverse fantasy, the meeting is an inspiring reality check and success story.

TSGS3-102e has 555 input contributions—some of them done jointly—from a total of 42 different companies, agencies, and academic institutions, as shown in the graph.

There are 123 registered participants from 63 different companies, agencies, and academic institutions. Ericsson, Huawei, and Samsung had the largest numbers. The US government and support entities collectively (largely clustered around DOD/NSA) had the most registrants—thirteen—although their actual engagement in the work is still nil, except for NIST passively joining 15 companies in calling for a new false base station detection work item.

The 555 contributions are devoted to the following important components of the global open 5G security framework as follows.

The advancement of the SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products is especially important and essential for effective 5G supply chain security. Seven proposed new study and work items touched upon key emerging needs—some drawing broad support.

New Study Items

• Security aspects on PAP/CHAP protocols in 5GS (China Telecom, Huawei/HiSilicon)
• UC3S_SID_revision (Huawei/HiSilicon)
• Rel17 SID on network slice security (Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, CableLabs, CATT, CAICT, China Unicom, China Mobile, InterDigital, NEC})

New Work Items

• 5GFBS [False Base Station Detection] (Apple, AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, Charter Communication, China Unicom, NIST, CableLabs, Interdigital, Ericsson, Samsung, CAICT, CATT, Intel, vivo, MITRE, Philips)
• Supporting NSWO (Nework Slice Orchestrator) in 5G (ATT, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell)
• 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols (Ericsson)
• AKMA (Authentication and Key Management for Applications) Ua protocol profiles (Qualcomm)

It only harms the nation to create a fake 5G initiative for pandering to Trump to create an insular 5G MAGAverse. We are dealing here with a continuum of globally interconnected communication networks and services that have existed since 1850 pursuant to international treaties. A 5G MAGAverse is a death sentence for the nation’s viability.

The U.S. private sector is actually doing a reasonably good job in participating in the forums working on the real 5G Security Framework. The Federal government just needs to: 1) do a better job supporting the private sector and allies in the participation in the real 5G security work, and 2) bolster the analytical capabilities and tailored programs of the expert national security agencies and facilitate their enhanced participation in venues such as SA3.