In February 2018, I wrote a post titled “Starlink and Cuba, a Match Made in Low-Earth Orbit?” That was just before SpaceX launched its test satellites and before it had applied to the ITU for permission to offer satellite Internet service. At that time, Cuba was testing, but had not yet offered, 3G mobile service, and home DSL up to a maximum speed of 2 mb/s had just become available at locations near phone company central offices in Havana and a few other cities. Internet service was essentially nonexistent in rural Cuba.

Starlink was a “paper tiger” in 2018, but SpaceX promised much better service than what was available or even dreamed of in Cuba, but it was not offered then and is still not legally available in Cuba today. When asked about Starlink service in Cuba in March 2026, Elon Musk tweeted, “Works in Cuba, just can’t be sold there.”

The fact that Starlink works in Cuba is demonstrated by terminals that have been smuggled in and are operating illegally. ChatGPT’s best estimate of the number of Starlink terminals in Cuba today is 800, with a low of at least 350-450 and perhaps as many as 1,200-1,500. One Miami vendor supports over 300 “roaming” Cuban clients.

Today, Starlink is a proven, robust technology that would be of great value to the Cuban people and economy, but it is banned because the government cannot control it—it cannot be cut off or spied upon, and that frightens the government. That fear has cost the Cuban people dearly.

China, which has played a dominant role in the development of the Cuban Internet, will soon have three operational low-Earth orbit Internet-service constellations online: Guowang, Qianfan, and Honghu-3. Guowang will provide a backbone and focus on government applications. Qianfan is a broadband and direct-to-device provider similar to SpaceX, and Honghu-3 was announced relatively recently and is behind the schedules of the others.

Cuba is suspicious of the US and Starlink, but China is a strong ally that has played a major role in developing the Cuban Internet. Chinese companies like ZTE, TP-Link, and especially Huawei have been the primary suppliers of Cuban telecommunication infrastructure, and this relationship has served as an example of cooperation for China’s Digital Silk Road program in Latin America. Going beyond telecommunications, Reuters reports that China is quietly supplanting Russia as Cuba’s main benefactor with infrastructure investments in solar power, transportation, and port infrastructure.

Qianfan is the most likely constellation to establish service in Cuba. They market through local partners (like ETECSA) rather than selling directly to consumers and are negotiating with or have commitments from around 30 nations. To date, Brazil is the only Latin American nation with a Qianfan agreement—a deal with Cuba would be strategic. Qianfan would work with ETECSA to provide whatever security and surveillance they could, and even if there were some loss of control, Cuban propagandists and trolls would be able to compensate by reaching a wider audience :-).