As we approach the WSIS+20 Review, the future of Internet governance is at a crossroads. In its January 29th submission, the Regional Commonwealth in the Field of Communications (RCC)—representing Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Rostelecom—advocates for a state-led governance model that challenges the Western-led multistakeholder approach.

The submission reflects an ongoing ideological divide between sovereignty and openness in digital governance. At stake is not just the question of who controls the Internet but whether the Internet remains a global, open, and inclusive platform or becomes increasingly fragmented by geopolitical interests. The RCC submission calls for stronger governmental authority over Internet governance, citing the Tunis Agenda to justify a leading role for states in shaping digital policy. It argues that the multistakeholder model is in crisis, pointing to perceived Western dominance in Internet governance institutions, regulatory fragmentation, and the absence of an international legal framework.

The proposal echoes the “digital sovereignty” doctrine pursued by Russia and China, which emphasizes state control over national Internet infrastructure, strict regulation of digital platforms, and a shift toward UN-led governance rather than the current multistakeholder model. This approach seeks to limit the role of non-state actors, including civil society, academia, and the private sector, in Internet policymaking—potentially leading to a more state-centric and restrictive global digital order.

While the RCC submission raises legitimate concerns about digital governance, its proposed solutions present significant risks. The document misrepresents the multistakeholder model, advocates for a binding international legal framework, and fails to prioritize human rights and digital freedoms.

The RCC contends that stakeholder roles remain undefined, leading to confusion and inefficiency. However, this perspective overlooks a fundamental reality: Internet governance is intentionally decentralized. The multistakeholder model is designed to prevent monopolization, fostering collaboration among governments, businesses, technical experts, and civil society in shaping digital policies. Rather than being inherently Western-dominated, it has evolved to amplify voices from the Global South, promote inclusivity, and ensure diverse perspectives are considered. While power imbalances and structural imperfections exist, these challenges are best addressed through greater participation, capacity building, and governance reforms—not by consolidating control under state-led structures that risk undermining openness, suppressing dissent, and stifling innovation.

The RCC submission proposes the creation of an international treaty to regulate Internet governance, arguing that it would reduce fragmentation, enhance cybersecurity, and establish global norms. While harmonization of regulations is important, a binding international framework could have unintended consequences. Governments with authoritarian tendencies could use such a framework to justify censorship, surveillance, and restrictions on online freedoms. Democratic nations favor flexible, consensus-driven models that adapt to evolving technologies and threats, whereas rigid top-down treaties could be exploited by repressive regimes to curtail digital rights and limit cross-border collaboration.

One of the most glaring flaws in the RCC’s proposal is its failure to emphasize human rights, free expression, and privacy protections. While it discusses digital inclusion and infrastructure, it neglects the foundational principles of an open Internet, including freedom of expression, non-discrimination, and access to information. The omission is not accidental. Governments that advocate for state-controlled Internet governance often view free expression and digital activism as threats. Without clear protections for digital rights, a state-led governance model risks enabling greater censorship, repression, and exclusion.

The RCC submission warns against Western dominance in the digital economy, framing it as a form of “digital colonialism.” While power imbalances in digital markets exist, the real issue often lies in domestic regulatory environments. Many governments impose restrictive policies that limit local innovation, stifle competition, and discourage global cooperation. Blaming external forces for digital inequalities ignores the role of state-imposed barriers, including internet shutdowns, restrictive licensing laws, and policies that discourage foreign investment in digital infrastructure. If the goal is to foster a more inclusive digital economy, then the solution lies in removing these barriers, investing in digital literacy, and ensuring fair competition—not in isolating national digital spaces under tighter government control.

Notably, the RCC submission offers a mixed contribution to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). On the positive side, its emphasis on ICT-driven economic growth and innovation aligns with SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) and SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation & Infrastructure). By advocating for expanded Internet access, digital literacy, and infrastructure investment, it also supports SDG 4 (Quality Education) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities). However, the state-controlled approach introduces severe risks to digital governance and inclusion. It undermines SDG 16 (Peace, Justice & Strong Institutions) by reducing transparency, accountability, and open governance. It also weakens SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals) by discouraging multistakeholder cooperation in favor of state dominance. Rather than promoting an equitable and open digital environment, the RCC approach could entrench power imbalances and exacerbate digital authoritarianism.

The WSIS process has been a platform for digital cooperation and governance for two decades. However, the RCC submission reflects a broader geopolitical struggle over Internet governance. If control shifts from a multistakeholder approach to a state-led model, the Internet could become more fragmented and politically driven, less inclusive and participatory, and more prone to censorship and restrictive policies. The WSIS+20 Review must reinforce the multistakeholder model, ensuring that governance remains open, decentralized, and adaptable, inclusive of all voices—governments, the private sector, and civil society—while being rooted in fundamental human rights principles.

Rather than undermining the multistakeholder model, WSIS+20 should focus on strengthening inclusivity and capacity building, addressing regulatory challenges without restricting freedoms, and enhancing cooperation between governments, industry, and civil society. While sovereignty concerns are legitimate, they must not be used as a pretext for authoritarian control over the digital space. The Internet thrives on openness, collaboration, and decentralization. The challenge ahead is to preserve these values while ensuring that digital governance remains fair, accountable, and beneficial for all.