Internet Protocol

Join the Quantum Internet Hackathon 2018

The eighth RIPE NCC hackathon takes on the Quantum Internet! The hackathon will be held during the weekend before RIPE 77 in Amsterdam, and is co-organised by QuTech and TU Delft, along with the RIPE NCC. We're bringing together network operators, quantum networking researchers, students, hackers, software developers and artists, to imagine and build the tools for the future Internet.

An Update on Securing BGP from IETF 102

One way or another we've been working on various aspects of securing the Internet's inter-domain routing system for many years. I recall presentations dating back to the late '90's that point vaguely to using some form of a digital signature on BGP updates that would allow a BGP speaker to assure themselves as to the veracity of a route advertisement.

Addressing Technical and Operational Needs with TechOps

In the ICANN realm, TechOps stands for Technical and Operations and its goal is to simplify processes, to find solutions, and to advise on technical and operational matters. There are three TechOps groups: The Registry, the Registrar and the joint Registry and Registrar, also known as Contracted Party House (CPH). How did we get there and what exactly are we doing?

Internet Evolution: Another 10 Years Later

Ten years ago, I wrote an article that looked back on the developments within the Internet over the period from 1998 to 2008. Well, another ten years have gone by, and it's a good opportunity to take a little time once more to muse over what's new, what's old and what's been forgotten in another decade of the Internet's evolution... The evolutionary path of any technology can often take strange and unanticipated turns and twists.

Routing Attacks on Internet Services

This post was co-authored by Yixin Sun, Annie Edmundson, Henry Birge-Lee, Jennifer Rexford, and Prateek Mittal. In this post, we discuss a recent thread of research that highlights the insecurity of Internet services due to the underlying insecurity of Internet routing. We hope that this thread facilitates important dialog in the networking, security, and Internet policy communities to drive change and adoption of secure mechanisms for Internet routing.

Connectivity as a Vital Consumer Service

Having Comcast et al provide Internet connectivity is like having your barber do surgery because he knows how to use a knife. I was reminded of this when my Comcast connection failed. This is part of the larger topic of consumerization. In the past, we were happy to have products that worked at all. I grew up in the world of consumer products and got my start in software building online services meant for use by non-experts.

Just One Bit

I'm never surprised by the ability of an IETF Working Group to obsess over what to any outside observer would appear to be a completely trivial matter. Even so, I was impressed to see a large-scale discussion emerge over a single bit in a transport protocol being standardized by the IETF. Is this an example of a severe overload of obsessive-compulsive behaviour? Or does this single bit represent a major point of design principle...

IETF and Crypto Zealots

I've been prompted to write this brief opinion piece in response to a recent article posted on CircleID by Tony Rutkowski, where he characterises the IETF as a collection of "crypto zealots." He offers the view that the IETF is behaving irresponsibly in attempting to place as much of the Internet's protocols behind session level encryption as it possibly can. ... Has the IETF got it wrong? Is there a core of crypto zealots in the IETF that are pushing an extreme agenda about encryption?

Usenet, Authentication, and Engineering (or: Early Design Decisions for Usenet)

A Twitter thread on trolls brought up mention of trolls on Usenet. The reason they were so hard to deal with, even then, has some lessons for today; besides, the history is interesting. (Aside: this is, I think, the first longish thing I've ever written about any of the early design decisions for Usenet. I should note that this is entirely my writing, and memory can play many tricks across nearly 40 years.)

Do We Really Need a New BGP?

From time to time, I run across (yet another) article about why Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is so bad, and how it needs to be replaced. This one, for instance, is a recent example. It seems the easiest way to solve this problem is finding new people - ones who don't make mistakes - to work on BGP configuration, building IRR databases, and deciding what should be included in BGP?