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DDoS attacks, phishing scams and malware. We battle these dark forces every day - and every day they get more sophisticated. But what worries me isn't just keeping up with them, it is keeping up with the sheer volume of devices and data that these forces can enlist in an attack. That's why we as an industry need to come together and share best practices - at the ICANN community, at the IETF and elsewhere - so collectively we are ready for the future.
Bruce Schneier's recent blog post, "Someone is Learning How to Take Down the Internet", reported that the incidence of DDOS attacks is on the rise. And by this he means that these attacks are on the rise both in the number of attacks and the intensity of each attack. A similar observation was made in the Versign DDOS Trends report for the second quarter of 2015, reporting that DDOS attacks are becoming more sophisticated and persistent in the second quarter of 2016.
We recently received an email from a customer asking about hybrid DDoS mitigation and its ability to stop large application layer attacks. Here's the truth: Hybrid DDoS mitigation works and can stop large application layer attacks. Hybrid DDoS mitigation typically involves a purpose-built DDoS mitigation appliance or software on dedicated hardware that sits immediately in front of or behind an enterprise's edge router.
The 24th DNS-OARC meeting was held last week in Buenos Aires -- a two-day DNS workshop with amazingly good, consistent content. The programme committee are to be congratulated on maintaining a high quality of presentations. Here are my picks of the workshop. They fall into three groups, covering themes I found interesting... These presentations related to the ongoing problem of DNS as a source of reflection attacks, or a victim of attempted DDoS...
Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks have been the frustration of information technology professionals for many years. When asked, most tell you they wish their internet service providers (ISPs) would simply provide them "clean pipes" all the time and take care of DDoS attacks upstream before they ever get to them. Unfortunately, the resources (equipment and personnel) necessary to clean Internet connections all the time are very expensive and come with several downsides.
In its security bulletin, Akamai's Security Intelligence Response Team (SIRT) reported on abuse of DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) when mounting a volumetric reflection-amplification attack. This is not news, but I'll use this opportunity to talk a bit about whether there is a trade-off between the increased security provided by DNSSEC and increased size of DNS responses that can be leveraged by the attackers.
Every year, Verisign iDefense Security Intelligence Services produces its Cyberthreats and Trends Report, which provides an overview of the key cybersecurity trends of the previous year and insight into how Verisign believes those trends will evolve. This report is designed to assist in informing cybersecurity and business operations teams of the critical cyberthreats and trends impacting their enterprises, helping them to anticipate key developments and more effectively triage attacks and allocate their limited resources.
Over the last couple of years, the networking industry has grown aware of the various security issues that could potentially have a huge impact on their operations. One of the topics that has raised in appeal is DNS security. Considering that much of the publicity around DNS is made by vendors trying to differentiate their solutions, there are many misconceptions out there that guide people into making poor investment in their infrastructure.
'It could've been worse' is a fascinating expression. It implies that the incident in question obviously could have been worse than expected, however it also implies that it could have been better, ultimately leading to the conclusion that it was at least somewhat bad. So both fortunately and unfortunately for three Greek banks, the ransom DDoS attacks levied against them by hacker group the Armada Collective could have been worse.
Last week I asked on a post elsewhere, why we, at the MLi Group, chose to consider speakers, panelists, supporters and sponsors at our Global Summit Series (GSS) as "Thought Leaders" and "Trend Setters? Many wrote me directly offering their answers and then it dawned on me that my answer may (or may not) get appreciated by many at the ICANN community. So here is why we do.
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