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In previous installments we've been looking at aspects of the design of the DNS. In today's grand finale we look at the the subtle but very knotty issue of names inside and outside the DNS. In the early years of the DNS, domain names were typically resolved to A records which were used to identify a host running a service. With the notable exception of e-mail, once the host was identified, the name no longer mattered.
The front page story of the September 13 2011 issue of the International Herald Tribune said it all: "Iranian activists feel the chill as hacker taps into e-mails." The news story relates how a hacker has "sneaked into the computer systems of a security firm on the outskirts of Amsterdam" and then "created credentials that could allow someone to spy on Internet connections that appeared to be secure." According to this news report this incident punched a hole in an online security mechanism that is trusted by hundreds of millions of Internet users all over the network.
When it comes to building a robust globe-spanning network of crimeware and making the victims dance to a tune of the cyber-criminals' choosing, you're guaranteed to find domain name abuse at the heart of the operation. DNS provides the critical flexibility and underlying scalability of modern command-and-control (C&C) infrastructure. Cyber-criminals that master DNS (and manage to maintain the stream of new domain registrations that keep it fed) tend to find themselves in command of the largest and most profitable crimeware networks.
In previous installments we've been looking at aspects of the design of the DNS. Today we look at the relationship of similar names in the DNS. A poorly appreciated aspect of the DNS is that there is no inherent relationship between similar looking names.
The leaked release of the European Commission's working papers on the future of Top Level Domains highlights the impending collision between adherents of the present "multistakeholder" ICANN governance model, and an ever longer list of national governments who challenge that model. At the core of the controversy is the question of how ICANN can claim legitimacy in the DNS world when none of its Directors or Officers are elected. Even worse, its only answer, when challenged legally, is that it is responsive to its contract with an agency of the U.S. Government...
In the five previous exciting installments, we've been looking at aspects of the design of the DNS. Today we look at records types, and how you can tell what a DNS record means. All the records in the DNS are strongly typed. Each record includes an RRTYPE, a small number, which defines both the format of the record and what the record means. It is possible and common to have different record types with the same format, but different meanings.
In the previous four installments, we've been looking at aspects of the design of the DNS. Today we look at the amount of data one can ask the DNS to store and to serve to clients. Most DNS queries are made via UDP, a single packet for query and a single packet for the response, with the packet size traditionally limited to 512 bytes. This limits the payload of the returned records in a response packet to about 400 bytes...
The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) is a suite of IETF-developed specifications designed to validate information provided by the Domain Name System (DNS). ... When the root zone was signed in June 2010, this acted as a catalyst for TLD operators to deploy DNSSEC on their side. We have seen a gradual but significant increase in signed TLDs since then. The map in this post shows the level of DNSSEC deployment in Europe.
In the previous installments, we've been looking at aspects of the design of the DNS. Many databases go to great effort to present a globally consistent view of the data they control, since the alternative is to lose credit card charges and double-book airline seats. The DNS has never tried to do that. The data is roughly consistent, but not perfectly so.
In the previous installments, we looked at the overall design of the DNS and the way DNS name matching works. The DNS gains considerable administrative flexibility from its delegation structure. Each zone cut, the place in the DNS name tree where one set of DNS servers hands off to another, offers the option to delegate the administration of a part of the DNS at the delegation point.