Earlier this week, Poland’s new President, Karol Nawrocki, vetoed amendments to the Act on Assistance to Citizens of Ukraine, provoking debate over critical satellite connectivity. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Affairs Krzysztof Gawkowski warned that the veto “de facto switched off Starlink for Ukraine,” potentially disrupting connectivity for hospitals, schools, and government operations.

The President’s office quickly responded, clarifying that “nothing changes in the financing of Starlink for Ukraine” under either the existing law or the President’s own draft¹. Nonetheless, the current statutory authority for Polish funding of Starlink terminals and subscriptions is set to expire at the end of September 2025. Without legislative action, the legal basis for continued support could cease.

Scale and Scope of Support

Starlink operates over 6,000 satellites in low Earth orbit, with roughly 2,500 terminals deployed in Ukraine via Polish assistance. These terminals provide connectivity in areas where terrestrial networks are destroyed or unreliable.

Polish Funding: Poland contributes tens of millions of euros annually, covering hardware, subscriptions, logistics, and installation. Starlink user terminals cost approximately $500–$600 each, with monthly service fees of $100–$150 per terminal. With 2,500 terminals in Ukraine, Poland’s annual contribution likely exceeds €30–40 million. This includes deployment support, training, and maintenance. Compared to broader EU or NATO contributions, Poland’s investment is significant for a single member state, reflecting both political commitment and strategic calculation to ensure Ukrainian digital resilience along the frontline areas.

Political Dynamics in Warsaw

The veto has sparked immediate political debate. Gawkowski described the move as a “knife in the back” of Ukraine, while government spokesperson Adam Szłapka emphasized that sustaining Starlink connectivity aligns with Polish national security, keeping the frontline distant from Polish borders².

The President’s office insists there will be no immediate service disruption. However, analysts note that uncertainty remains if a statutory extension is not enacted. Ukraine has already discussed assuming partial financing responsibility for Starlink terminals as a contingency.³

Private Infrastructure as a Strategic Asset

The Polish Starlink situation highlights a recurring challenge: private networks are increasingly treated as critical strategic assets, yet governance remains fragmented. Starlink is indispensable to Ukraine’s operations, supporting battlefield communications, hospitals, schools, and government functions. Yet decisions about its provision depend on political calculations in other states or corporate priorities.

This highlights the risk of relying solely on private infrastructure for critical national resilience. Without multistakeholder-based model of governance, connectivity can be affected by domestic political disputes, corporate decisions, or changes in funding.

Starlink Alternatives and Complementary Networks

The debate over Polish funding also ties into the broader question of redundancy and alternatives in Ukraine. As previously discussed in CircleID⁴, OneWeb is the primary low Earth orbit alternative to Starlink. Germany has financed fewer than 1,000 OneWeb terminals in Ukraine, with plans to expand to 5,000–10,000.

Alternatives: OneWeb can help provide backup coverage for fixed sites or services that do not need very low latency, but it cannot match Starlink’s capacity, speed, or integration in Ukraine. Like previous discussions about 5G, choosing alternative networks should also consider cybersecurity risks and political trust. It’s not just about technology—planners must think about security, reliability, and the political implications of moving critical communications to another provider.

This context highlights why the Polish veto is strategically sensitive: Starlink’s integration into Ukraine’s operations is already extensive, and even brief funding disruptions could strain redundancy systems.

European and Strategic Considerations

The EU is aware of the strategic implications of satellite networks. Projects like IRIS² aim to reduce reliance on private operators, but operational deployment will not mature until the late 2020s. In the meantime, member states, including Poland, remain dependent on Starlink to sustain Ukrainian digital resilience.

Russian state media has already noted the veto, framing it as a weakening of Western support at a critical stage in Ukraine’s negotiations. This demonstrates the geopolitical sensitivity of digital infrastructure beyond its technical or commercial dimensions.

Key Takeaways

• Satellites involved: 6,000+ Starlink satellites globally; ~2,500 terminals deployed in Ukraine via Polish support.
• Polish funding: Estimated €30–40 million annually, covering terminals, subscriptions, logistics, and training.
• Legislative context: Current authority expires September 30, 2025; presidential veto delays extension.
• Political positions: Deputy PM warns of potential cutoff; President’s office says financing continues; government spokesperson emphasizes strategic necessity.
• Alternatives: OneWeb provides complementary coverage but lacks Starlink’s capacity, latency, and integration; cybersecurity and political trust must also be key considerations.

Digital Infrastructure Governance: Lessons from Poland

The Polish veto demonstrates that decisions in domestic politics can extend far beyond national borders, influencing the operation of critical digital infrastructure in conflict zones. Starlink, while a private network, has become a de facto public utility for Ukraine, supporting government operations, healthcare, education, and communications. Poland’s case illustrates how political disputes over funding, legislation, or social policy can ripple across digital governance ecosystems, affecting both infrastructure and operational continuity.

For the technical community and policymakers, this episode highlights the need to integrate strategic digital infrastructure into effective multilateral and multistakeholder-based networks. Reliance on commercial networks for critical national functions requires careful consideration of regulatory oversight, contractual obligations, contingency planning, and international coordination. Even short-term domestic decisions can have long-term operational consequences, highlighting the intersection of private satellites, public funding, and national security strategy.

In short, Poland’s Starlink experience serves as a cautionary tale: as critical Internet infrastructure becomes increasingly globalized, maintaining resilience and continuity demands that governance, technical planning, and strategic policy be closely aligned. Without such integration, private networks supporting public or allied interests remain vulnerable to unilateral political or corporate decisions, creating systemic risks to both digital infrastructure and societal resilience.