July 15, 2010 (yesterday) marked the end of the beginning for DNSSEC, as the DNS root was cryptographically signed. For nearly two decades, security researchers, academics and Internet leaders have worked to develop and deploy Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC). DNSSEC was developed to improve the overall security of the DNS, a need which was dramatized by the discovery of the Kaminsky bug a few years ago.
As the implementation of DNSSEC continues to gather momentum and with a number of ccTLDs, and the '.org' gTLD having deployed it into their production systems, I think it is worth pausing to take a look at the entire DNSSEC situation. Whilst it is absolutely clear that DNSSEC is a significant step forward in terms of securing the DNS, it is but one link in the security chain and is therefore not, in itself, a comprehensive solution to fully securing the DNS system.
Capacity and scalability are necessary in managing DNSSEC and D/DoS. Capacity, necessary for maintaining operations during D/DoS attacks, is also necessary for increased traffic due to DNSSEC deployment. Scalability is highly important, as DNSSEC is deployed not only will greater traffic levels will be encountered, greater demand will be placed on the DNS platform. In the interest of understanding both capacity and scalability CommunityDNS conducted tests to assess the readiness of the two main DNS server platforms, BIND and NSD...
It's no secret that Comcast has been leading the charge of DNSSEC deployment among ISPs. For the past couple years, Comcast has been testing and pushing for the widespread adoption of DNSSEC. In the spirit of increasing adoption, I thought I would interview the DNS gurus at Comcast to see what they've learned and what advice they would give other ISPs considering DNSSEC deployment.
As many of you may know, today .ORG announced that all of its 8.5 million domains are now able to be fully DNSSEC signed - the largest set of domain names in the world so far that has access to this key security upgrade. .. The widespread publicity that the Kaminsky bug got around the world vindicated a decision made in several companies to invest time, effort and money into deploying DNSSEC. The community was split on the value of the DNSSEC effort -- many thought the deployment was quixotic, while a few others thought it was appropriate.
Attendees at the public ICANN meeting in Brussels today heard from over two dozen companies that have implemented or are planning to support DNSSEC, the next-generation standard protocol for secured domain names. It is clearer than ever before that DNSSEC is becoming a reality.
With DNSSEC for the root zone going into production in a couple of weeks, it is now possible for Top Level Domain (TLD) managers to submit their Delegation Signer (DS) information to IANA. But what does this really mean for a TLD? In this post we're going to try to sort that out.
The global deployment of Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) is charging ahead. With ICANN 38 Brussels just around the corner, DNSSEC deployment will inevitably be the hot topic of discussion over the next few days. Case in point, today, ICANN hosted the first production key ceremony at a secure facility in Culpepper, Va. where the first cryptographic digital key was used to secure the Internet root zone. The ceremony's goal was simple: for the global Internet community to trust that the procedures involved with DNSSEC are executed correctly and that the private key materials are stored securely.
As the shorter of the ICANN interregnums comes to a close and the ICANN faithful finalize their dinner reservation agendas for Brussels, it is time again for a preview of what will be 'on-tap' at next week's ICANN meeting. While, as always, there is a lot going on in ICANN Land, a scan of the blogosphere and ICANN list serves suggests that the four most discussed topics will be...
Less than a week ago, I posted a short blog piece entitled "Can ICANN Please Stop Shooting Itself in the Foot?" in which I questioned ICANN's actions in connection with the recently announced key signing ceremony. At the end of this piece I asked the question: "While it seems that ICANN continues it propensity to shoot itself in the foot, does the community need to start worrying about when ICANN takes aim at other more vital organizational body parts?" Well it looks like I only had to wait five days to get the answer to that question.