The barriers to DNSSEC adoption are quickly disappearing. There are nearly 20 top-level domains that have already deployed DNSSEC including generic TLDs like .org and .gov. This July, the DNS root will also be signed, and will begin validating. At this point, the decision for remaining TLDs to deploy DNSSEC is really no longer a question.
One would think with an annual budget in excess of 60 million dollars a year and a staff of upwards of 140 (including consultants), that someone would have figured out how to prevent the organization from repeatedly shooting itself in the foot. Unfortunately not even a year of star-fish management oversight by the likes of Rod Beckstrom seems to have done the trick. Exhibit One, earlier this week on CircleID we learned about the first Root Zone DNSSEC KSK Ceremony on Wednesday 2010-06-16 in Culpeper, VA, USA. Of course given the significance of this event one would reasonably assume that ICANN might mention this somewhere on the main page of their website?
ICANN will hold the first Root Zone DNSSEC KSK Ceremony on Wednesday 2010-06-16 in Culpeper, VA, USA. ... Attendance within the key ceremony room itself will be limited to just those with an operational requirement to execute the ceremony. However, since this event has generated significant interest, we have made additional space available in an adjacent room for observers who wish to attend the event.
As a registrar at the front end of the DNSSEC deployment effort, our technical team has made a sustained investment in DNSSEC deployment so that our customers don't get overwhelmed by this wave of changes to the core infrastructure of the Domain Name System. Along the way, we've learnt a lot about how to implement DNSSEC which might hold useful lessons for other organizations that plan to deploy DNSSEC in their networks.
Earlier this week in a press release, VeriSign said that they are selling their SSL certificate business to Symantec. VeriSign is the dominant player in this market, having absorbed competitor Thawte in 1999, and Geotrust in 2006. Three years ago, when VeriSign decided to divest its non-core businesses, they kept the certificate business. So what's changed?
The most recent episode of The Ask Mr. DNS Podcast offers up some disturbing corroborating evidence as to the extent of DNS filtering and outright blocking occurring in China. VeriSign's Matt Larson and InfoBlox's Cricket Liu, who co-host the geeky yet engaging and extremely informative show, held a roundtable discussion including technical experts from dynamic name service providers (better known as "managed DNS" services) DynDNS, TZO, No-IP, and DotQuad, as well as Google and Comcast.
The deployment of Domain Security Extensions (DNSSEC) has crossed another milestone this month with the publication of DURZ (deliberately unvalidatable root zone) in all DNS root servers on 5 May 2010. While this change was virtually invisible to most Internet users, this event and the remaining testing that will occur over these next two months will dictate the ultimate success of DNSSEC deployment across the Internet.
The project to sign the DNS root zone with DNSSEC took an additional step toward completion yesterday with the last of the "root server" hosts switching to serving signed DNSSEC data. Now every DNS query to a root server can return DNSSEC-signed data, albeit the "deliberately unvalidatable" data prior to the final launch. Another key piece for a working signed root is the acceptance of trust anchors in the form of DS records from top-level domain operators. These trust anchors are used to form the chain of trust from the root zone to the TLD.
IT security specialists have known for years that the plain DNS is not to be trusted. Any hope for improvement rests on the DNSSEC protocol deployment. In this post, I will review the current status in one critical aspect, namely the DNS root signature key management. The other two foremost are the application usage of DNSSEC protocol functionality and the operational front, or the extent of deployment in the DNS infrastructure. The operational front includes the support by the DNS root nameservers, but my focus on signature key management leaves this issue aside.
The registries (gTLDS) are all moving towards signing in about a year. PIR and .org is going to be first with .edu, .biz, and others closely behind. The root is scheduled to be signed in the beginning of July (end of June looking at the holiday calendar) being the biggest milestone. Some of the roots already contain DNSSEC information. Other ccTLDs continue to turn DNSSEC on with countries on every continent signed.