DNS |
Sponsored by |
Where has DNSSEC been successful? What are some current statistics about DNSSEC deployment? What are examples of innovations that are happening with DNSSEC and DANE? All of these questions will be discussed at the DNSSEC Workshop at ICANN 53 in Buenos Aires happening on Wednesday, June 24, 2015, from 09:00 – 15:15 Argentina time (UTC-3). You can watch and listen to the session live.
The U.S. Government's decision to transition its legacy role as the administrator of the IANA functions contract to the global multi-stakeholder community is an important step in the continued evolution of the Internet. While the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) supports this transition, we strongly believe that a comprehensive accountability framework, developed, agreed to and approved by the multi-stakeholder community must be in place in advance of finalizing any IANA transition recommendations.
It is not often I go out to my driveway to pick up the Washington Post -- yes, I still enjoy reading a real physical paper, perhaps a sign of age -- and the headline is NOT about how the (insert DC sports team here) lost last night but is instead is about an IT technology. That technology is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), a major Internet protocol that has been around for more than a quarter century, before the Internet was commercialized and before most people even knew what the Internet was.
If you are at all interested in how the Internet's Domain Name System (DNS) works, then one of the most rewarding meetings that is dedicated to this topic is the DNS OARC workshops. I attended the spring workshop in Amsterdam in early May, and the following are my impressions from the presentations and discussion. What makes these meetings unique in the context of DNS is the way it combines operations and research, bringing together researchers, builders and maintainers of DNS software systems, and operators of DNS infrastructure services into a single room and a broad and insightful conversation.
In those circles where Internet prognostications abound and policy makers flock to hear grand visions of the future, we often hear about the boundless future represented by "The Internet of Things". This phrase encompasses some decades of the computing industry's transition from computers as esoteric piece of engineering affordable only by nations, to mainframes, desktops, laptops, handhelds, and now wrist computers. Where next?
Denial of service attacks have been around since the Internet was commercialized and some of the largest attacks ever launched relied on DNS, making headlines. But every day a barrage of smaller DNS-based attacks take down targets and severely stress the DNS ecosystem. Although DNS servers are not usually the target of attacks they are often disrupted so attention from operation teams is required. There is no indication the problem is going away and attackers continue to innovate.
Perceptions can be difficult to change. People see the world through the lens of their own experiences and desires, and new ideas can be difficult to assimilate. Such is the case with the registration ecosystem. Today's operational models exist because of decisions made over time, but the assumptions that were used to support those decisions can (and should) be continuously challenged to ensure that they are addressing today's realities. Are we ready to challenge assumptions? Can the operators of registration services do things differently?
This Sunday, March 22, 2015, the second Registration Operations Workshop (ROW) will be taking place at the Fairmont Dallas hotel from 12:30 -- 4:30 pm CDT. Discussion will include extensions to EPP, new encryption initiatives and also suggestions for ways to further automate DNS interactions between registries, registrars and DNS operators, including a need to do this for DNSSEC.
A blog post has created some attention online through its extremely negative attitude to DNSSEC. Through the years, I have come in contact with many arguments against DNSSEC that suggest that anyone who is critical has not managed to or wanted to familiarize themselves with what DNSSEC is and does. We have received many questions concerning the article, so I feel it's appropriate to respond to the criticism.
Are you interested in sharing lessons you've learned in deploying DNSSEC or DANE with the wider community? Have you performed new measurements related to DNSSEC deployment that you want to share publicly? Do you have a new tool or service that you think people in the DNSSEC community would find interesting? Are you seeking feedback on some ideas you have to make DNSSEC better or easier to deploy?