A CircleID post by Alexander Klimburg takes aim at my article, "The Power to Govern Ourselves," delivered at the Gig-Arts conference in June. That speech, available here on the blog, argued that: "Multistakeholder does not describe a governance model. It never has. It was always a compromised Public Relations concept," one that muddied the distinction between governance by state actors and non-state actors. What really made the Internet institutions unique was their break with sovereignty.
The reports of multistakeholder Internet governance's demise are greatly exaggerated. This article explores the dual nature of multistakeholderism: its evolving, sometimes contentious practice as the "First Body," and its enduring principle of actor plurality as the "Second Body." Despite criticism and challenges, multistakeholderism remains crucial for a resilient, non-state-led Internet, underscoring the need to adapt and uphold its foundational pluralism.
Abusive behavior that leverages the domain name system (DNS) continues to be a problem, with a reach that has been widely and credibly documented. There is little doubt that bad actors continue to use the DNS for nefarious and costly purposes. While the amendments made in 2024 to ICANN's Registry Agreement (RA) and Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) were a step in the right direction, more advanced tools are needed to bring abuse rates down.
The European Union (EU) has set a high bar by tackling domain name system (DNS) abuse head on via government regulation and seems to have successfully resisted attempts to water down DNS stewardship obligations. Recent guidance from a key European Commission cooperation group (the NIS Cooperation Group) handling sections of the Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2) intends for a robust implementation of Article 28, which will go a long way toward helping to mitigate some of the longstanding problems that persist in the DNS.
On October 20th, ICANN and Verisign renewed the agreement under which Verisign will continue to act as Root Zone Maintainer for the Domain Name System (DNS) for another 8-year term. The Root Zone sits atop the hierarchical architecture of the DNS and is essential to virtually all internet navigation, acting as the dynamic, cryptographically secure, global directory of all top-level domains that exist in the DNS.
In a world where the internet is central to communication, innovation, and economic growth, governing this vast digital ecosystem is a complex challenge. The multi-stakeholder approach, which involves governments, private entities, civil society, technical experts, and end-users, has long served as the cornerstone of Internet governance, ensuring that decision-making remains open and inclusive.
Over the past twenty years of my engagement in the ICANN multistakeholder process, one topic that has always been near and dear to me has been improving the accuracy and access to domain name registration data in a way that respects the legal rights of both registrants and requestors of registration data. Sadly, the glacial pace at which ICANN develops and implements policy has prevented a holistic solution to the problem.
ICANN must act now to harmonize its domain name registration data (commonly known as WHOIS) policies with Article 28 of the European Union's Network and Information Security (NIS2) directive, first to adhere to applicable laws as it fulfills its oversight responsibilities and, second, to keep its word to the community to preserve WHOIS to the fullest extent possible under law.
Interisle Consulting Group today released its fourth annual Phishing Landscape report investigating where and how cybercriminals acquire naming and hosting resources for phishing. Our study shows that cybercriminals evolved their tactics for obtaining attack resources, including sharply increasing their exploitation of subdomain and gateway providers.
At the recent Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 80 Policy Forum meeting, one notable takeaway was its close focus on questions around the stability and security of the technical layer of the Internet: the growing risks which assail it, and potential ways to address these through governance.