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Mike Hammer's thoughtful article, A Few Thoughts on the Future of Email Authentication, should trigger thoughtfulness in the rest of us. Email abuse has been around a long time. Anti-abuse efforts have too. Yet global abuse traffic has grown into the 90+% range, with no hint of trending downward. The best we hear about current effectiveness is for last-hop filtering, if you have the money, staff and skills to apply to the problem...
With the Online Trust Alliance Town Hall Meeting and Email Authentication Roundtable next week as well as the RSA Conference, I decided to pause and think about where we are and where we might be headed with regard to email authentication. Over the years, many of us have collectively worked to provide a framework for authenticating email...
Four senators (Rockefeller, Bayh, Nelson, and Snowe) have recently introduced S.773, the Cybersecurity Act of 2009. While there are some good parts to the bill, many of the substantive provisions are poorly thought out at best. The bill attempts to solve non-problems, and to assume that research results can be commanded into being by virtue of an act of Congress. Beyond that, there are parts of the bill whose purpose is mysterious, or whose content bears no relation to its title.
So this Internet thing, as we discussed in our last article, is broken. I promised to detail some of the specific things that are broken. Implicit trust is the Achilles heel of the Internet... All of the communication between the resolver and the DNS server is in plain text that can be easily seen and changed while in transit, further, the resolver completely trusts the answer that was returned...
NeuStar's UltraDNS faced attack on two fronts on Tuesday, March 31. One of the attacks was technical -- a massive denial-of-service attack. The second was a rather surprising opening strike from competitor Dynamic Network Services (DynDNS), which launched a full-scale (and in T1R's opinion, misguided) public relations broadside. First, to the actual denial of service attack. Contrary to many early reports, UltraDNS was not 'down' on Tuesday...
The market has failed to secure cyberspace. A ten-year experiment in faith-based cybersecurity has proven this beyond question. The market has failed and the failure of U.S. policies to recognize this explains why we are in crisis. The former chairman of the Security and Exchange Commission, Christopher Cox, a longtime proponent of deregulation, provided a useful summary of the issue when he said, "The last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not work."...
Throughout this series of articles we've been talking about DKIM, and what a valid DKIM signature actually means. .. What this means for senders (of any type) is that with DKIM, you’re protected. On the internet, your domain name is a statement of your brand identity – so by signing messages with DKIM, you can finally, irrevocably tie those messages to your brand.
The Internet as we know it and use it today -- is broken, badly broken. Yes broken so much so that we are really crazy to have any expectations of privacy or security. Yes, really. The Internet was conceived as somewhat of a utopian environment, one where we all keep our doors, windows and cars unlocked and we trust all the people and machines out there to "do the right thing...".
This article is the first in an occasional series on DKIM/ADSP edge cases that may not be generally recognized or understood. Many people advocate DKIM/ADSP adoption without fully recognizing potential implementation and operational issues. The fact is that the email messaging environment is fraught with opportunities for poor outcomes because of common practices that need to be considered or poorly understood implementations that are not considered...
Once you've determined that you can trust the signer of a message, as we discussed in part 3, it's easy to extrapolate that various portions of the message are equally trustworthy. For example, when there's a valid DKIM signature, we might assume that the From: header isn't spoofed. But in reality, DKIM only tells us two basic things...
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