Beyond the caricature of Internet fragmentation, it is time for a federalism of trust that overcomes the unilateral governance of the last five decades through a new global digital compact.

Another internet is possible. Welcome to Meltnet and the debate of ideas!

The narrative of Internet fragmentation, repeated tirelessly by defenders of the status quo of American governance, masks a more complex and promising reality. We are not witnessing the collapse of global connectivity, but the birth of a new architecture of digital power. The concept of Meltnet—a fusion of national networks with compatibility corridors—which I recently proposed offers the historic opportunity to build an alternative model of digital governance that preserves sovereignty without sacrificing interoperability. The idea here is to better develop the proposal from the point of view of its configuration and operation.

For five decades, Internet governance has operated under the tacit hegemony of the United States. The IANA/ICANN transition in 2016, celebrated as a milestone of “de-Americanisation”, merely consolidated a system that, in practice, was assumed by transnational technology conglomerates, financial capital, private standardisation entities with extraterritorial reach. When Edward Snowden revealed the massive espionage by big tech in 2013, where Brazil was one of the main targets, it became clear that the “open and democratic Internet” was, in fact, an infrastructure of surveillance and control. The response of some nation-states to Snowden’s revelations was not irrational fragmentation, but strategic reterritorialisation. China, Russia and other countries began to build technical-regulatory perimeters, data localisation and, in extreme cases, disconnection architectures.

The result is not a clean break, but selective interoperability, where layers connected for the common user coexist with sovereign islands for strategic data, finance and critical infrastructures. In this context, BRICS has emerged as the most articulated bloc in building an alternative digital architecture. Representing 48.5% of the world’s population and 41% of the global economy, the group demonstrates that digital sovereignty is not authoritarian paranoia, but a development strategy to reduce power asymmetries and ensure autonomy over strategic assets. The group of 11 countries can be a natural leader for the initial establishment of a condominium of nation-states concerned with preserving their digital sovereignty within a multilateral environment of greater trust.

Proactive architecture

Unlike the concept of splinternet, which caricatures a scenario of reactive and uncoordinated fragmentation, Meltnet proposes a proactive architecture of national networks that merge through compatibility corridors. It is a federalism of trust where each state maintains control over its digital perimeter whilst establishing mechanisms of mutual recognition with trusted partners. The essence of this proposal rests on building national trust infrastructures that mutually recognise each other, allowing countries interested in adhering to the model to design data transfer corridors calibrated by sectoral risk, with clear rules and effective contestation mechanisms, instead of accepting cross-border free flow as “all or nothing”.

Building a functional Meltnet demands coordination across multiple layers of digital architecture. The first step is already underway in physical infrastructure. The 17th BRICS Summit Meeting in Rio de Janeiro in July 2025 approved a feasibility study for the construction of its own network of fibre-optic submarine cables connecting the 11 member countries. The study will be financed by the New Development Bank, the BRICS bank. As President Lula stated, this infrastructure “will increase speed, security and sovereignty in data exchange”. Complementing the cables, BRICS should expand the network of regional traffic exchange points, which function as digital roundabouts where different networks exchange information directly. By keeping traffic within national or regional borders, these points not only reduce transmission costs and time, but also give states greater control over domestic data flows.

The technical heart of Meltnet would be a system of mutual recognition of digital identities and cryptographic keys amongst BRICS countries, expandable to other interested parties. Each country would maintain its own national digital certification infrastructure—Brazil has had ICP-Brasil since 2001—but protocols would be established so that these different infrastructures would mutually recognise certificates issued by each other. It would function like a sworn translation system amongst notaries from different countries: each maintains its autonomy and internal standards, but there are agreed mechanisms to validate each other’s documents.

In practice, each country would continue to issue digital certificates to entities within its jurisdiction through its certification authorities. A multilateral entity, potentially linked to the New Development Bank, would operate as a certification bridge, validating and digitally signing the certificates of national authorities. This would create a chain of trust that crosses borders without diluting sovereignties. Countries would agree on minimum standards for issuing, renewing and auditing certificates, preserving flexibility for each to have more stringent local requirements if desired. A real-time synchronisation mechanism would share information about revoked or compromised certificates, protecting the entire federation against fraud.

Federated resolution

In parallel, each country would operate its own domain name resolution system, maintaining compatibility with the global system for commercial and non-critical domains. Russia has already advanced in this direction with its Sovereign Internet Law of 2019. This service in Brazil is administered by a private entity supervised by the Internet Steering Committee, with mere institutional representation of the government.

The system would function on two levels. The first resolution section would be dedicated to specific domains of Meltnet member countries, such as addresses ending in, for example, .brics, .bri or designated strategic national domains. When a user in Brazil attempted to access such an address, their computer would consult the Brazilian DNS server, which in turn would redirect the query to a BRICS root server, obtaining the answer directly without passing through the global root servers controlled mostly by entities with American influence. This closed circuit within the bloc would guarantee complete autonomy for resources considered strategic, whilst reducing latency in communications amongst member countries.

The second level of resolution would handle conventional global domains, such as those ending in .com or .org, maintaining compatibility with the rest of the Internet. In this case, when a Brazilian user made a query, the local DNS server would first check the shared cache amongst the federated network member countries, where recent resolutions made by any bloc member would be stored. If the information were available there, the response would be immediate and faster. Otherwise, the server would consult the global root servers, following the traditional path, but would store the result in the Meltnet condominium cache to speed up future queries from any bloc country. This architecture would create a layer of redundancy and efficiency, allowing traffic amongst countries to be optimised whilst preserving interoperability with the rest of the Internet.

The crucial question is how it would function when someone outside the bloc attempted to access a .brics domain. Imagine a European user typing www.banco.brics into their browser. Their computer would consult the European DNS server, which in turn would ask the global root servers about this address. At this point, two situations are possible: if there is no agreed delegation, the server would simply respond that the domain does not exist, generating an error for the European user. Alternatively, and this would be the ideal technical solution, the global root servers would have a special entry delegating all .brics addresses to servers operated by the condominium, exactly as it works today with national domains like .br, .ru or .cn, the difference being that .brics would be managed collectively by the bloc and not by a single country or entity.

This technical arrangement, however, runs into a significant political issue: ICANN, the entity that coordinates the creation of new top-level domains, would need to approve .brics, and historically this process has been long and subject to geopolitical pressures. An alternative solution that would bypass this dependence would be for Meltnet members to operate public DNS servers in multiple geographical locations, announcing them as alternatives to traditional root servers, following the model that Google and Cloudflare already use with their public DNS. Countries and Internet providers could then voluntarily opt to use these BRICS servers, guaranteeing access to the bloc’s domains without needing external approval. The advantage would be total autonomy, though with the disadvantage of requiring voluntary adoption instead of automatic universal recognition.

To enable commercial transactions without dependence on intermediaries under United States jurisdiction, the condominium could implement a blockchain-based platform for international commerce. Each country would operate validators in its sovereign infrastructure, using consensus mechanisms appropriate for a federation of states. Smart contracts in open-source code would be audited by technical bodies from each country before deployment, integrating with central bank digital currency initiatives already under development, for example, by BRICS members. It would be a way to end the suffocating dependence on the SWIFT system.

In the applications layer, a federated superapp inspired by Russian and Chinese models, but with open architecture, would allow citizens and businesses to obtain digital identity recognised in all member countries. Unlike existing closed models, it would operate with public programming interfaces, allowing decentralised innovation. Services would include international payments, document validation and access to government services during travel or commercial transactions amongst bloc countries.

Governance model

Contrary to what the so-called technical community maintains, architecture alone does not guarantee the initiative’s success. A governance model is needed that overcomes both the corporate capture of the “multi-stakeholder” model and the risks of authoritarian centralisation. Meltnet must be anchored in verifiable principles that transform good intentions into verifiable practices. Periodic audits of national certification infrastructures, with public results, would ensure that mutual recognition was based on technical standards, not blind trust. Unilateral adequacy decisions would be replaced by plurilateral agreements with clear procedural safeguards, adaptable to different legal contexts.

Minimum standards for content removal orders, blocking and technical sanctions would ensure reasoning, proportionality, judicial review and public documentation. Infrastructure and content¹ would be spheres arbitrated separately. Public records of all administrative actions affecting interoperability would include challenge windows before implementation. Open protocols for traffic exchange and minimum compatibility between national systems would prevent network perimeters from transforming into absolute walls.

A new protocol for Meltnet

The initial proposal would run on the existing TCP/IP infrastructure for eminently pragmatic reasons. Interoperability with the rest of the world would be maintained automatically, all the physical infrastructure already installed—routers, switches, network equipment—already supports these protocols, there would be no learning curve for technicians and developers who already master these technologies and migration could occur gradually without abrupt ruptures. At this first moment, what would effectively change would not be the base communication protocol, but the upper layers of the architecture: the public key infrastructure in the application layer, the domain name resolution system in the logical layer, the blockchain layer for international commerce also operating above TCP/IP and preferential routing which, although acting in the network layer, would remain fully compatible with existing standards.

The analogy that best illustrates this approach is building a new toll system on motorways that already exist, instead of building completely new motorways from scratch. Traffic would continue to flow through the same physical and logical routes, but with differentiated control points, prioritisation and management for certain types of users or destinations. This strategy allows BRICS to build its digital autonomy by leveraging decades of consolidated technological development, avoiding the risk and astronomical cost of creating an entirely new protocol stack that would inevitably face compatibility problems with the existing global ecosystem.

In a line reaching for greater autonomy, China has been developing a proposal for a new communication protocol that would replace TCP/IP. The so-called New IP was presented at the International Telecommunication Union in 2019, developed primarily by Huawei in partnership with Chinese operators. The standard brings technical characteristics significantly different from current protocols. Addressing would be variable, different from IPv4 with its fixed 32 bits or IPv6 with 128 bits, allowing flexible sizes according to need. Quality of service features and traffic control would be embedded directly in the protocol, each device and user would have a unique and verifiable identifier on a mandatory basis, and routing could be done based on context, taking into account the type of content, the user or the application that is trafficking.

The official Chinese justification for this proposal emphasises better support for the Internet of Things with its billions of connected devices, quality of service guarantee for critical applications like telemedicine or autonomous vehicles and enhanced security through unequivocal identification of all network participants. The fundamental philosophical difference is that whilst current TCP/IP follows the principle of intelligence at the network edges, leaving control decentralised, New IP adopts a philosophy of centralised intelligence in the network itself, facilitating control.

If the Meltnet condominium decided to fully adopt New IP, it would achieve total independence from hegemonic infrastructure and superior network control and management capabilities, aligning with the Chinese vision of digital governance. The costs of this choice would be high since incompatibility with the rest of the world would require complex gateways for external communication, replacement of equipment with high costs. This would require complete adoption of New IP over an extended timeframe, due to both technical and financial limitations.

The most realistic and advisable scenario would be hybrid coexistence in layers. For international communications with countries outside the condominium, traditional TCP/IP would be maintained ensuring full interoperability with the global Internet and cross-certification for transaction security. Within each country, critical sectors such as energy infrastructure, water and transport, e-government and national financial systems could experiment with New IP or their own national protocols, with gateways at the borders converting between TCP/IP and the new protocol as necessary. For communications amongst Meltnet member countries, TCP/IP would be used with proprietary extensions developed collaboratively, including mandatory security encapsulation, preferential routing that prioritised traffic within the new network, and differentiated quality of service for this traffic. This layered architecture would allow the bloc to maintain integration with the world using TCP/IP whilst developing capabilities analogous to New IP for internal transactions, similar to how the European Union maintains its global trade integration, but uses the euro to facilitate transactions amongst its members.

The most prudent path would be to start the first five years building Meltnet layers on standard TCP/IP, implementing the federated public key infrastructure, the dual DNS system we described earlier and blockchain for international commerce, all running on already established communication protocols. Ten years later, the second phase would involve controlled experimentation with New IP in specific sectors such as industrial Internet of Things and smart city projects, always accompanied by rigorous evaluation of costs, benefits and risks, plus development of reliable bidirectional gateways that would allow fluid communication between New IP and TCP/IP zones.

From 2035 onwards, based on concrete results from previous phases, the bloc would make an informed strategic decision amongst three options: maintain TCP/IP if safeguards implemented in the application layer prove sufficient to guarantee sovereignty; partially adopt New IP only for critical sectors whilst maintaining TCP/IP for general use; or proceed to complete adoption of New IP if the geopolitical situation demands total separation from infrastructure governed by entities linked to the USA. This phased approach allows continuous learning and reversibility, avoiding premature commitments to technologies that may prove inadequate or excessively risky for individual freedoms.

Obstacles and resistance

Implementation of this vision faces significant obstacles. The political-institutional systems of member countries vary drastically. Harmonising privacy standards, freedom of expression and due process between Brazil, with its constitutional democracy, China, with its single-party institutional model, and Russia, with its presidential centralism, is a considerable challenge. It is not just about technical differences, but fundamental values about the role of the state, individual rights and the limits of public power².

Technological asymmetries also weigh. Whilst China and India have robust digital ecosystems, other members depend heavily on imported technology. Meltnet will only work if accompanied by genuine technology transfer, sovereign industrial policy and investment in local capacity-building. It is not enough to import equipment and software; it is necessary to develop internal competencies that allow independent maintenance, adaptation and innovation.

The United States and allies will certainly respond with sanctions, technological restrictions and influence campaigns. BRICS, as one of the proposal’s guarantors, needs to anticipate these responses and build resilience, diversifying technology sources, creating strategic reserves and developing alternatives for critical components. Recent history shows how technological sanctions can paralyse entire countries when they depend on single suppliers.

There is also the risk of regulatory capture, where multilateral governance is controlled by specific corporate or state interests. Power-balancing mechanisms, civil society participation and leadership rotation are essential to prevent Meltnet from reproducing, on a regional scale, the problems it seeks to solve on a global scale. Duplicating infrastructures and developing proprietary systems require massive investment. The New Development Bank will have a crucial role, but financing cannot come conditioned on loss of autonomy.

Brazilian differential

Brazil possesses unique advantages to lead the construction of Meltnet. ICP-Brasil has been operating for 24 years, IX.br is amongst the world’s largest traffic exchange points, and the country’s strategic position as an anchorage point for submarine cables in the South Atlantic is unparalleled. Brazil’s multilateral tradition and capacity to build bridges between power blocs are valuable diplomatic assets. The democratic system of checks and balances can serve as a model for safeguards against abuses. With 215 million inhabitants, a diversified economy and massive adoption of new technologies, Brazil is an indispensable actor for any regional architecture.

However, to realise this potential, the country needs to overcome its historic subordination to the hegemonic neoliberal agenda in Internet governance. Although the regulation of illegal gambling by Anatel and the Ministry of Finance demonstrates regulatory capacity, more ambitious advancement is necessary. A Brazilian strategy would include modernising ICP-Brasil for certification of connected devices, autonomous systems and artificial intelligence. The consolidation of all government data in national infrastructure, with qualifications and energy efficiency counterparts for large cloud providers wishing to operate in the country, would be a fundamental step. Finally, the government would need to assume effective management of the domain names and numbers infrastructure, which emerged privately in the 1990s.

A legal framework for interoperability would ensure data flows between countries under safeguards, creating a digital commercial corridor. Active digital diplomacy, with leadership in Internet governance forums and articulation of coalitions around verifiable principles, would complete the strategy. It is not about isolating the condominium from the rest of the world, but about creating alternatives that increase bargaining power and reduce geopolitical vulnerabilities.

Institutional antidotes

The difference between a democratic and a dystopian sovereign Internet lies in the institutional antidotes we incorporate from the start. Every decision affecting digital perimeters must be public and justified, with policy transparency that allows scrutiny. Technical entities without corporate ties regularly auditing trust infrastructures would create layers of accountability. Open records of executive orders, content removals and technical interventions would allow civil society, media and oversight bodies to monitor abuses.

Auditor rotation, stakeholder diversity and protected whistleblowing mechanisms are countermeasures against capture. Specialised courts with technical capacity to judge digital disputes quickly would ensure that rights were defended effectively, not just formally. The question is not “sovereignty or openness”, but rather “under what conditions does digital sovereignty preserve freedoms?”. The answer lies in technical architectures that incorporate democratic guarantees, making abuses technically difficult and legally costly.

The Internet of the coming years will inevitably be plural. The choice is not between preserving the “single Internet” that never was democratic or chaotic fragmentation. The choice is between ungoverned fragmentation, where each country builds isolated digital walls, and sovereign fusion, where national networks connect through verifiable and auditable bridges. A Meltnet effectively agreed upon amongst countries is not a technological utopia, but a feasible political project that requires multilateral coordination, sustained investment, regulatory standardisation and, above all, political will to confront American digital hegemony.

The technical elements are available: federated certification systems, sovereign name resolution, commercial platforms, regional exchange points, proprietary submarine cables. The challenge is to stitch these components into a coherent architecture that preserves both national autonomy and regional interoperability. For BRICS, Meltnet represents something greater than digital infrastructure. It is an instrument of foreign policy, a tool for economic development and, fundamentally, an exercise of sovereignty in the 21st century.

In a world where data is one of the main commodities and digital platforms exercise power previously reserved for nation-states, building proprietary trust architectures is not a choice, but an imperative of political survival. As I wrote previously, the dystopian fable of total digital control need not be our destiny. But the alternative, of digital sovereignty with preserved freedoms, will not happen spontaneously. It demands constitutional engineering of the network, investment in critical infrastructures and, above all, political courage to imagine and build alternatives to the status quo. As the initiative’s leader, BRICS has the opportunity to lead this construction and, in a way, has already begun to do so.