I believe and strongly support Internet Principle and Right Coalition (IPRC) Charter is an important edition of document supplementing the principles and rights of individual internet users in any developing and least developed country. Especially in Asia Pacific region where the need and use of such document is immense, as there is a gap in recognition and awareness of rights of internet users.
FireEye announced a new piece of malware yesterday named MULTIGRAIN. This nasty piece of code steals data from Point of Sale (PoS) and transmits the stolen credit card numbers by embedding them into recursive DNS queries. While this was definitely a great catch by the FireEye team, the thing that bothers me here is how DNS is being used in these supposedly restrictive environments.
In October 2012, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Intelligence Committee issued a joint statement warning American companies that were doing business with the large Chinese telecommunications companies Huawei and ZTE to "use another vendor." The bipartisan statement explains that the Intelligence Committee's Report, "highlights the interconnectivity of U.S. critical infrastructure systems and warns of the heightened threat of cyber espionage and predatory disruption or destruction of U.S. networks if telecommunications networks are built by companies with known ties to the Chinese state, a country known to aggressively steal valuable trade secrets and other sensitive data from American companies."
We recently received an email from a customer asking about hybrid DDoS mitigation and its ability to stop large application layer attacks. Here's the truth: Hybrid DDoS mitigation works and can stop large application layer attacks. Hybrid DDoS mitigation typically involves a purpose-built DDoS mitigation appliance or software on dedicated hardware that sits immediately in front of or behind an enterprise's edge router.
In its bid to be free of U.S. government oversight ICANN is leaning on the global multistakeholder community as proof positive that its policy-making comes from the ground up. ICANN's recent response to three U.S. senators invokes the input of "end users from all over the world" as a way of explaining how the organization is driven. Regardless of the invocation of the end user (and it must be instinct) ICANN cannot seem to help reaching back and slapping that end user across the face.
Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks have been the frustration of information technology professionals for many years. When asked, most tell you they wish their internet service providers (ISPs) would simply provide them "clean pipes" all the time and take care of DDoS attacks upstream before they ever get to them. Unfortunately, the resources (equipment and personnel) necessary to clean Internet connections all the time are very expensive and come with several downsides.
In its security bulletin, Akamai's Security Intelligence Response Team (SIRT) reported on abuse of DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) when mounting a volumetric reflection-amplification attack. This is not news, but I'll use this opportunity to talk a bit about whether there is a trade-off between the increased security provided by DNSSEC and increased size of DNS responses that can be leveraged by the attackers.
Every year, Verisign iDefense Security Intelligence Services produces its Cyberthreats and Trends Report, which provides an overview of the key cybersecurity trends of the previous year and insight into how Verisign believes those trends will evolve. This report is designed to assist in informing cybersecurity and business operations teams of the critical cyberthreats and trends impacting their enterprises, helping them to anticipate key developments and more effectively triage attacks and allocate their limited resources.
Over the last couple of years, the networking industry has grown aware of the various security issues that could potentially have a huge impact on their operations. One of the topics that has raised in appeal is DNS security. Considering that much of the publicity around DNS is made by vendors trying to differentiate their solutions, there are many misconceptions out there that guide people into making poor investment in their infrastructure.
Throughout the course of my career I've been blessed to work with some of the most talented folks in the security and cyber threat intelligence (CTI) mission space to create a variety of different capabilities in the public, private and commercial sectors. Before I came to lead the Verisign iDefense team about five years ago, I had to evaluate external cyber-intelligence vendors to complement and expand the enterprise capabilities of my former organization.