While Congress and the White House deliberate possible actions on FISMA reform and increased oversight of critical infrastructure, relatively little attention is being given to the government-wide cybersecurity regulation already in place, the Data Quality Act (DQA). Unlike FISMA, which primarily governs the government's internal cybersecurity processes, and contemplated legislation and/or Executive Order(s), which would likely also include a focus on critical infrastructure protection, the DQA contains a unique mandate.
A few weeks ago, the New York Times published an article saying that the Stuxnet worm, which infected a large number of Iran's nuclear power plants, was a joint effort between the United States and Israel. The program began under former president George W. Bush and continued under President Obama. Last month, the Washington Post ran an article saying that the US and Israel collaborated in a joint effort to develop Flame and that work included Stuxnet.
I read an interesting article in the Wall Street Journal today entitled Cyber Criminals Sniff out Vulnerable Firms. It's a story of a small business owner in New York whose company was broken into by cyber criminals and stole $1.2 million from its bank accounts, although the owner was able to later recover about $800,000 of that. The moral of the story is that small businesses feel like they are not a major target for online thefts like these.
There's been a lot of emphasis on DNS performance lately because faster DNS contributes directly to a better user experience. There's an interesting flipside to DNS performance though, higher performance DNS servers may be better targets for cache poisoning attacks. Faster servers give attackers more opportunities to insert fake entries into the DNS - speed can kill (or at least inflict a nasty wound!) so it's important to understand the security implications if you're looking to upgrade DNS performance.
As a bit of a history buff I can't avoid a slight tingling of déjà vu every time I read some new story commenting upon the ethics, morality and legality of cyber-warfare/cyber-espionage/cyberwar/cyber-attack/cyber-whatever. All this rhetoric about Stuxnet, Flame, and other nation-state cyber-attack tools, combined with the parade of newly acknowledged cyber-warfare capabilities and units within the armed services of countries around the globe, brings to the fore so many parallels... Call me a cynic if you will, but when the parallels in history are so evident, we'd be crazy to ignore them.
US presidential candidate Mitt Romney will likely be reconsidering his email passwords after his online email account was reportedly hacked. A hacker claims to have accessed Romney's Hotmail and Dropbox accounts after guessing the answer to the Republican candidate's 'favourite pet' security question. It's suspected Romney used the same password for more than one account.
The technical press is full of reports about the leak of a hashed password file from LinkedIn. Worse yet, we hear, the hashes weren't salted. The situation is probably both better and worse than it would appear; in any event, it's more complicated.
An article in Forbes the other day reports on US Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano's comments that 'cybercrime represents the "greatest threat and actual activity that we have seen aimed at the west and at the United States" in addition to "or other than Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda-related groups."' ..."Napolitano cited a study commissioned by Symantec that put the total worldwide cost of cybercrime at $388 billion -- higher than the global market for heroin, cocaine and marijuana combined."
In a blog post, Stewart Baker proposed restricting access to sophisticated anti-virus software as a way to limit the development of sophisticated malware. It won't work, for many different and independent reasons. To understand why, though, it's necessary to understand how AV programs work. The most important technology used today is the "signature" - a set of patterns of bytes - of each virus. Every commercial AV program on the market operates on a subscription model...
There has been a lot of discussion lately about the potential for IPv6 to create security issues. While there are definitely some security risks of IPv6 deployment, a carefully considered implementation plan can help mitigate against security risks. As we approach World IPv6 Launch tomorrow, I thought it prudent to share the below described incident that iDefense recently observed.