Threat Intelligence

Securing the Routing System at NANOG 74

The level of interest in the general topic of routing security seems to come in waves in our community. At times it seems like the interest from network operators, researchers, security folk and vendors climbs to an intense level, while at other times the topic appears to be moribund. If the attention on this topic at NANOG 74 is anything to go by we seem to be experiencing a local peak.

KSK Rollover, Elliptical Curve Vulnerabilities, Surveillance and Privacy. Are We Building Trust?

ICANN just recently performed a Root Zone DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Key Signing Key (KSK) Rollover. The recent KSK Rollover that took place on the 11th October 2018. The KSK Rollover has been successful and congratulations are in order. The Root Zone DNSSEC Key Signing Key "KSK" is the top most cryptographic key in the DNSSEC hierarchy. The KSK is a cryptographic public-private key pair.

Pen Testing the US Cyber Strategy

If it's not an era of intense faith in the multilateral system, somewhere among the Trump Administration's anonymous adults in the room there is a believer, and the Internet might be the better for it. Evidence for the existence of this fifth columnist lies in the US National Cyber Strategy, launched last month under the commander-in-chief's unprepossessing signature, which looks to provide security for America's connected economy.

The Diet Pill Security Model

The information security industry, lacking social inhibitions, generally rolls its eyes at anything remotely hinting to be a "silver bullet" for security. Despite that obvious hint, marketing teams remain undeterred at labeling their companies upcoming widget as the savior to the next security threat (or the last one -- depending on what's in the news today). I've joked in the past that the very concept of a silver bullet is patently wrong...

IPv6 Security Considerations

When rolling out a new protocol such as IPv6, it is useful to consider the changes to security posture, particularly the network's attack surface. While protocol security discussions are widely available, there is often not "one place" where you can go to get information about potential attacks, references to research about those attacks, potential counters, and operational challenges.

The Security Talent Gap Is Misunderstood and AI Changes It All

Despite headlines now at least a couple of years old, the InfoSec world is still (largely) playing lip-service to the lack of security talent and the growing skills gap. The community is apt to quote and brandish the dire figures, but unless you're actually a hiring manager striving to fill low to mid-level security positions, you're not feeling the pain -- in fact, there's a high probability many see problem as a net positive in terms of their own employment potential and compensation.

BGP Security: A Gentle Reminder that Networking is Business

At NANOG on the Road (NotR) in September of 2018, I participated in a panel on BGP security -- specifically the deployment of Route Origin Authentication (ROA), with some hints and overtones of path validation by carrying signatures in BGP updates (BGPsec). This is an area I have been working in for... 20 years? ... at this point, so I have seen the argument develop across these years many times, and in many ways.

The Root KSK Rollover? What Does It Mean for Me?

In a little over two weeks, precisely in 17 days (on 11 October 2018 at 16:00 UTC), ICANN will roll the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) root Key Signing Key (KSK). If you are a Domain Name System (DNS) and DNSSEC expert already engaged globally on the topic, you are certainly both well aware and ready for the rollover. This article is probably not for you! If however, you are out there focused on your day to day running or managing a DNS infrastructure...

Lessons Learned from the Namejuice/DROA/DROC Outage

Last week an ICANN registrar, Namejuice, went off the air for the better part of the day -- disappearing off the internet at approximately 8:30 am, taking all domains delegated to its nameservers with it, and did not come back online until close to 11 pm ET. That was a full business day and more of complete outage for all businesses, domains, websites, and email who were using the Namejuice nameservers -- something many of them were doing.

Continued Threats from Malware

As part of my job, I manage an incident response team that was engaged by a significant organization in Georgia whose network was infected by the QBOT (a.k.a. QAKBOT) malware. The customer had been infected for over a year, several teams before ours had failed to solve the problem, and they continued to get reinfected by the malware when they thought they had eradicated it. Over time it had spread to more than 1,000 computers in their ecosystem stealing user credentials along the way.