In early 2026, two processes began to unfold across Africa’s Internet governance landscape. Each, on its own, appeared entirely legitimate. Taken together, however, they reveal something more structural, something that goes beyond process and into the question of how authority itself is formed.

On one side, the African Network Information Centre (AFRINIC) initiated a formal review of its bylaws. The process followed a familiar pattern: an extended call for volunteers to the Bylaws Review Committee, a public consultation window scheduled to close on 10 May 2026, and a community engagement webinar set for 4 May 2026. From there, the process proceeds through analysis, drafting, and public presentation. It is deliberate, participatory, and grounded in the long-standing logic of the Regional Internet Registry (RIR) system.

On the other side, a continental initiative led by Smart Africa advanced toward the validation of an “Internet Governance Blueprint.” A Working Group Validation Workshop was convened with the explicit aim to:

“formally validate the Blueprint deliverables, consolidate inputs from the Working Group and the broader ecosystem, and ensure strong national ownership ahead of the wider dissemination phase.” REF

Individually, each process reflects a legitimate response to governance challenges. Yet their convergence raises a more fundamental question:

Where is authority being formed, and where is legitimacy being produced?

AFRINIC’s bylaws review reflects the core architecture of the RIR model. Participation is open, the process is iterative, and outcomes are shaped through community input. Its communications emphasize accountability, transparency, and responsiveness to evolving operational realities. In this framework, process is not merely administrative; it is constitutive. Authority exists because the community recognizes the process that produces it.

This is what has historically distinguished the RIR system: legitimacy is not granted externally, nor assumed; it is generated through participation.

The Smart Africa Blueprint operates at a different level.

It presents a continental framework aligned with broader strategic objectives such as Agenda 2063 and the Smart Africa Vision 2030. Within this framework, AFRINIC is explicitly identified as an object of reform: “Reforming an African Body for Assignment of Internet Addresses (AFRINIC).”

Alongside this, the Blueprint proposes the establishment of the Council of African Internet Governance Agencies (CAIGA), described as: “a continental coordination, validation, and policy-guidance body.”

More structurally significant is how CAIGA is positioned within the governance architecture: “CAIGA acts as the hinge between the multi-stakeholder Internet Governance community and ministerial decision-making.”

The Blueprint also reflects a multi-actor formulation process, acknowledging contributions from institutions including ICANN and Deutsche Gesellschaft for International Cooperation (GIZ).

ICANN has publicly stated that its role in such initiatives is limited to financial and administrative support, without directing policy outcomes.¹ The presence of such partners does not imply control over outcomes; however, it situates the formulation of governance frameworks within a broader multi-actor environment that operates alongside institutional processes.

Parallel Tracks of Governance

What emerges is not a conflict of processes, but the formation of two parallel tracks.

The first remains internal to AFRINIC, community-driven, procedurally grounded, and institutionally contained. The second unfolds at a continental level, coordinated, validated, and aligned across political and institutional actors. Both address the same question: how AFRINIC should evolve.

But they do not originate from the same locus of authority.

It is important to clarify whether AFRINIC has been invited to participate in the Smart Africa Internet Governance Blueprint Validation Workshop, and if so, at what level and in what capacity. The distinction is not procedural only but structural. Participation as an observer or technical contributor is consistent with institutional engagement; participation in a process framed as “validation” may carry different implications. In multistakeholder systems, legitimacy is derived from community-driven processes, and AFRINIC’s authority is anchored in its members and established procedures. If its representatives are present within external validation mechanisms without a clearly defined and publicly articulated role, there is a risk that such participation could be interpreted as implicit alignment with outcomes formulated outside its formal decision-making structures. This does not imply intent or outcome, but it raises a valid question: how can AFRINIC engage constructively with continental initiatives while preserving the principle that its governance reforms are ultimately determined through its own community processes? Maintaining that boundary both in substance and in perception is essential to safeguarding institutional legitimacy.

From Coordination to Authority: A Mechanism

This dynamic is not entirely without precedent. Coordination among governments, regional bodies, and external partners has long existed within Internet governance. However, such coordination has traditionally remained adjacent to institutional processes rather than structurally integrated with them. What distinguishes the present configuration is not the existence of coordination itself, but the degree to which it is formalized, sequenced, and aligned with implementation timelines that intersect directly with institutional decision-making processes.

To understand the significance of this configuration, it is necessary to move beyond description and examine the mechanism through which coordination may translate into authority.

Coordination, in itself, does not constitute authority. It becomes authoritative only when it shapes the constraints within which decisions are made. In this context, a plausible mechanism can be observed:

1. Governance challenges are framed within coordinated forums, establishing direction and priorities.
2. Stakeholders converge around shared narratives and strategic objectives.
3. Outputs are validated through workshops and working groups, producing pre-institutional alignment.
4. These positions enter formal institutional processes, such as AFRINIC’s bylaws review.
5. The existence of coordinated positions may narrow the range of outcomes that can be adopted without incurring political, reputational, or coordination costs.

At no single point does coordination become explicit control. Yet across the sequence, it may shape the environment in which authority is exercised.

A Testable Question

This leads to a question that can be evaluated empirically rather than assumed:

Do institutional actors retain the practical ability to diverge from externally coordinated frameworks without loss of legitimacy, support, or operational viability?

If the answer is yes, coordination remains advisory, and authority continues to reside within institutional processes.

If the answer becomes constrained, even informally, then authority has shifted in practice, even if no formal transfer has occurred.

The Shift in Legitimacy Formation

This dynamic can be understood as a shift from procedural legitimacy, in which authority is generated through institutional process, to a form of coordinated legitimacy formation, in which alignment is established across actors before decisions are formally enacted.

This analysis does not assume intent or outcome. It examines the structural relationship between parallel processes and their potential implications.

The question, therefore, is not whether AFRINIC’s procedures remain intact. They do.

The question is whether those procedures remain authorial, whether they continue to generate the decisions they ultimately formalize.

If direction is shaped outside the procedural space where decisions are formally adopted, the role of that space inevitably changes. Participation risks becoming less about shaping outcomes and more about confirming them. Institutional processes may continue to function, but their role in producing legitimacy begins to evolve.

In such a configuration, legitimacy risks no longer being generated within the process, and may instead become attached to it after the fact.

While this shift may appear conceptual, its implications are operational. Network operators and resource holders depend on the predictability, neutrality, and procedural clarity of registry governance. If the locus of authority becomes less clearly defined, or if policy direction is perceived to form outside established institutional processes, it may introduce uncertainty into how decisions are made, how disputes are resolved, and how resource allocation is governed. Even in the absence of formal change, the perception of external alignment can affect trust in the neutrality of the registry, which remains a foundational assumption for the stability of Internet operations.

This is not necessarily a failure of governance, nor is it inherently problematic, but a response to pressure.

Across the global Internet governance landscape, systems are being asked to coordinate at scale, represent regions collectively, and respond to political, economic, and security dynamics that extend beyond purely technical mandates. Continental frameworks are, in many ways, a natural response to these pressures.

The question is not whether such frameworks should exist. The question rather, is how they interact with the mechanisms that have historically produced legitimacy.

A broader question emerges when this configuration is viewed beyond a single region. What if similar frameworks, whether external to institutions or formed within them, begin to establish policy alignment around critical Internet resources before formal community processes take place? In different forms, such approaches have already been explored in contexts where states seek a more coordinated role in Internet governance, often framed in terms of Internet Governance, sovereignty, data sovereignty, or national security and regional alignment*. If replicated across multiple environments, this could lead to a gradual reconfiguration of the global Internet governance model. A shift from a distributed, multistakeholder system toward one shaped by coordinated blocs, operating either alongside or within existing institutional structures.

The issue is not the existence of coordination itself, but whether such coordination begins to define the boundaries within which institutional processes operate. At that point, the question extends beyond any single registry: it becomes one of global interoperability, coherence, and the long-term stability of a system that has historically relied on decentralized authority and shared legitimacy.

What is unfolding around AFRINIC is therefore not an isolated development. It reflects a broader transition, one in which authority and legitimacy risk drifting apart, not abruptly, but incrementally.

And in such transitions, the most important question is often the simplest:

Where is the authority to define reform constructed, and through which process is it ultimately legitimized?

As long as authority and legitimacy remain aligned, governance systems adapt and endure.

When they begin to diverge, even subtly, the system enters a different phase, one in which procedures continue, but their meaning changes.

That is the moment now facing Internet governance in Africa, and you will feel the ripples globally.

References

• ICANN’s Commitment to the Africa Community, 18 Nov 2025
• Smart Africa, Internet Governance Blueprint - Validation Workshop Agenda, 2026
• Smart Africa, Internet Governance Blueprint (v2.2), 2026
• Smart Africa, Continental Roadmap for Internet Governance (v2.2), 2026
• The battle for the internet