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For more than 30 years, the industry has used a service and protocol named WHOIS to access the data associated with domain name and internet address registration activities... The challenge with WHOIS is that it was designed for use at a time when the community of users and service operators was much smaller and there were fewer concerns about data privacy.
In an unexpected move, the two top U.S. officials charged with the Obama Administration's Internet policy have issued a joint statement severely criticizing draft Chinese domain policies. On May 16th, the State Department's Ambassador Daniel A. Sepulveda and NTIA's Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information Lawrence E. Strickling issued an official statement titled "China's Internet Domain Name Measures and the Digital Economy".
One of the most interesting and important changes to the internet's domain name system (DNS) has been the introduction of the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). These protocol extensions are designed to provide origin authentication for DNS data. In other words, when DNS data is digitally signed using DNSSEC, authenticity can be validated and any modifications detected.
Do you have an idea for an innovative use of DNSSEC or DANE? Have you recently deployed DNSSEC or DANE and have some "lessons learned" that you could share? Did you develop a new tool or service that works with DNSSEC? Have you enabled DNSSEC by default in your products? (And why or why not?) Do you have ideas about how to accelerate usage of new encryption algorithms in DNSSEC?
FireEye announced a new piece of malware yesterday named MULTIGRAIN. This nasty piece of code steals data from Point of Sale (PoS) and transmits the stolen credit card numbers by embedding them into recursive DNS queries. While this was definitely a great catch by the FireEye team, the thing that bothers me here is how DNS is being used in these supposedly restrictive environments.
The 24th DNS-OARC meeting was held last week in Buenos Aires -- a two-day DNS workshop with amazingly good, consistent content. The programme committee are to be congratulated on maintaining a high quality of presentations. Here are my picks of the workshop. They fall into three groups, covering themes I found interesting... These presentations related to the ongoing problem of DNS as a source of reflection attacks, or a victim of attempted DDoS...
The following rather alarming text caught my eye today... Had the text appeared under a less august letterhead, or signed by less qualified authors, there would be no cause for alarm. However, the letterhead was World Economic Forum and the authors were William J. Drake, Vinton G. Cerf, and Wolfgang Kleinwächter. As one of three coordinators for the Yeti-DNS project, this feels a bit like I'm in big trouble now. So, let's discuss the matter.
How do we make DNSSEC even more secure through the use of elliptic curve cryptography? What are the advantages of algorithms based on elliptic curves? And what steps need to happen to make this a reality? What challenges lie in the way? Over the past few months we've been discussing these questions within the community of people implementing DNSSEC, with an aim of increasing both the security and performance of DNSSEC.
What is the current state of DNSSEC deployment around the world and also in Africa? How can you deploy DNSSEC at a massive scale? What is the state of using elliptic curve crypto algorithms in DNSSEC? What more can be done to accelerate DNSSEC deployment? Discussion of all those questions and much more can be found in the DNSSEC Workshop streaming live out of the ICANN 55 meeting in Marrakech, Morocco, on Wednesday, March 9, from 9:00 to 15:15 WET.
Come join the discussion on Wednesday 17:15 UTC. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? As ICANN approaches its 18th birthday, it marks its ascension to adulthood and independence with a new framework of accountability. As we attempt to modernize and empower the organization with oversight of the DNS, the question of "who watches the watchmen?" is on the tip of everyone's tongue.