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A few weeks ago, on Oct. 1, 2016, Verisign successfully doubled the size of the cryptographic key that generates DNSSEC signatures for the internet's root zone. With this change, root zone DNS responses can be fully validated using 2048-bit RSA keys. This project involved work by numerous people within Verisign, as well as collaborations with ICANN, Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA).
Cable modem fraud can be a major source of revenue leakage for service providers. A recent study found that communication service providers lost $3 billion dollars worldwide due to cable modem cloning and fraudulent practices. To combat this problem, device provisioning solutions include mechanisms to prevent loss -- but what do you really need to protect your bottom line?
DDoS attacks, phishing scams and malware. We battle these dark forces every day - and every day they get more sophisticated. But what worries me isn't just keeping up with them, it is keeping up with the sheer volume of devices and data that these forces can enlist in an attack. That's why we as an industry need to come together and share best practices - at the ICANN community, at the IETF and elsewhere - so collectively we are ready for the future.
There is no network security technology more ubiquitous than the firewall. With nearly three decades of deployment history and a growing myriad of corporate and industrial compliance policies mandating its use, no matter how irrelevant you may think a firewall is in preventing today's spectrum of cyber threats, any breached corporation found without the technology can expect to be hung, drawn, and quartered by both shareholders and industry experts alike.
A few months ago I published a blog post about Verisign's plans to increase the strength of the Zone Signing Key (ZSK) for the root zone. I'm pleased to provide this update that we have started the process to pre-publish a 2048-bit ZSK in the root zone for the first time on Sept. 20. Following that, we will publish root zones with the larger key on Oct. 1, 2016.
Bruce Schneier's recent blog post, "Someone is Learning How to Take Down the Internet", reported that the incidence of DDOS attacks is on the rise. And by this he means that these attacks are on the rise both in the number of attacks and the intensity of each attack. A similar observation was made in the Versign DDOS Trends report for the second quarter of 2015, reporting that DDOS attacks are becoming more sophisticated and persistent in the second quarter of 2016.
In a recent talk at Black Hat, Apple's head of security engineering (Ivan Krsti?) described many security mechanisms in iOS. One in particular stood out: Apple's Cloud Key Vault, the way that Apple protects cryptographic keys stored in iCloud. A number of people have criticized Apple for this design, saying that they have effectively conceded the "Going Dark" encryption debate to the FBI. They didn't, and what they did was done for very valid business reasons -- but they're taking a serious risk...
In the 1980's internet connectivity meant allowing general public to communicate and share knowledge and expertise with each other instantly and where it was not possible otherwise. Take the story of Anatoly Klyosov, connecting Russia to the western world for the first time in 1982, as an example. A bio-chemist who was not allowed to leave the soviet territory for security reasons. The internet enabled him to participate in meetings with his counterparts at Harvard University, University of Stockholm and beyond.
State and county election officials across the country employ thousands of computers in election administration, most of them are connected (from time to time) to the internet (or exchange data cartridges with machines that are connected). In my previous post I explained how we must audit elections independently of the computers, so we can trust the results even if the computers are hacked.
There's been a lot of discussion of whether the November 2016 U.S. election can be hacked. Should the U.S. Government designate all the states' and counties' election computers as "critical cyber infrastructure" and prioritize the "cyberdefense" of these systems? Will it make any difference to activate those buzzwords with less than 3 months until the election? First, let me explain what can and can't be hacked. Election administrators use computers in (at least) three ways...