As a long-established online attack strategy, phishing remains a popular tool for fraudsters because of its effectiveness. The Anti-Phishing Working Group reported more than 300,000 distinct phishing attacks in December 2021 -- more than three times the number reported in early 2020, and the highest monthly total ever identified.
Counterfeiting is big business. A 2021 study by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated that the international trade in counterfeit and pirated products was worth up to $464 billion in 2019, or around 2.5% of all world trade. A significant proportion of this trade occurs via digital channels, where global annual expenditure on eCommerce is more than $4 trillion.
A web domain name is the foundational piece of internet property allowing its owner (registrant) to construct and host an associated website. On a domain, the owner is also able to construct whatever subdomains they wish -- a process that is technically achieved via the configuration of records on the authoritative domain name system (DNS) server.
The GNSO Council and the ICANN Board both seem poised to grant sufficient runway to the community to refine an idea for a simple ticketing system designed to centralize requests for registrant information disclosures and provide meaningful data that is likely to help ICANN staff enhance its assessment of the SSAD proposal. This is very good news for those who advocate for consumer safety and trust on the Internet, and it is very good news for the ICANN multistakeholder model.
The EARN IT Act was reintroduced into Congress last Monday, with the promise that it would end Internet platforms' "blanket immunity" for "tens of millions of photos and videos" of child sexual abuse that they allow to circulate online. With the bill already scheduled for hearing in committee, it's on track to be passed quickly. And why shouldn't it be, if its sponsors' claims about it are true? Perhaps because they're not true.
Hackers are using company domain names for malicious attacks more than ever before. Established research shows that phishing and related malware attacks most commonly occur from a compromised or hijacked legitimate domain name, a maliciously registered, confusingly similar domain name, or via email header spoofing. Domain security intelligence is the first line of defense in preventing domain cyberattacks.
The UK government is proposing new regulations to strengthen cyber resilience in the private sector. Their intention is to expand cybersecurity rules for critical infrastructure (CI) operators to include managed service providers (MSPs), more stringent breach notification requirements, and legislation to establish the UK Cyber Security Council as the standards development organization for the cybersecurity profession. This is a welcomed development, but more details about implementation and enforcement are needed.
The UK government launched its 2022 Cyber Security Strategy on 15 December 2021, outlining its ambitious plans to improve the resilience of UK institutions and businesses while protecting the country's interests in cyberspace. The strategy signals a more involved approach by the government, which previously relied heavily on the private sector for leadership. The government's stated commitment to a 'whole of society' approach sounds really good on paper, but what exactly does it really mean?
As a designated committee of experts prepares to draft a new treaty to combat the use of information and communications technologies in cybercrime at the UN in January 2022, it is paramount that other stakeholders oversee these discussions to avoid violating human rights on the Internet. This initiative was kickstarted by a 2019 resolution led by Russia and endorsed by other countries considered by many to behavior controversially on cybersecurity matters, such as China, Venezuela, Cambodia, North Korea, and others.
In the 2021 Domain Security Report, we analyzed the trend of domain security adoption with respect to the type of domain registrar used, and found that 57% of Global 2000 organizations use consumer-grade registrars with limited protection against domain and DNS hijacking, distributed denial of service (DDoS), man-in-the-middle attacks (MitM), or DNS cache poisoning. On average, the adoption of domain security controls is two times higher for enterprise-class registrars than for those using consumer-grade registrars.