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Throughout the course of my career I've been blessed to work with some of the most talented folks in the security and cyber threat intelligence (CTI) mission space to create a variety of different capabilities in the public, private and commercial sectors. Before I came to lead the Verisign iDefense team about five years ago, I had to evaluate external cyber-intelligence vendors to complement and expand the enterprise capabilities of my former organization.
'It could've been worse' is a fascinating expression. It implies that the incident in question obviously could have been worse than expected, however it also implies that it could have been better, ultimately leading to the conclusion that it was at least somewhat bad. So both fortunately and unfortunately for three Greek banks, the ransom DDoS attacks levied against them by hacker group the Armada Collective could have been worse.
We live in an online age, one where malware infections have become commonplace. Some might say this is the price of doing business online. News headlines report damaging attacks on well-known brands with depressing regularity. Consumer confidence suffers as customers look to organizations to sort out the issue, secure their transactions and fix the problem.
It seems that this last holiday season didn't bring much cheer or goodwill to corporate security teams. With the public disclosure of remotely exploitable vulnerabilities and backdoors in the products of several well-known security vendors, many corporate security teams spent a great deal of time yanking cables, adding new firewall rules, and monitoring their networks with extra vigilance.
The Internet is chock full of really helpful people and autonomous systems that silently probe, test, and evaluate your corporate defenses every second of every minute of every hour of every day. If those helpful souls and systems aren't probing your network, then they're diligently recording and cataloguing everything they've found so others can quickly enumerate your online business or list systems like yours that are similarly vulnerable to some kind of attack or other.
Over the past several months, CITP-affiliated Ph.D. student Sarthak Grover and fellow Roya Ensafi been investigating various security and privacy vulnerabilities of Internet of Things (IoT) devices in the home network, to get a better sense of the current state of smart devices that many consumers have begun to install in their homes. To explore this question, we purchased a collection of popular IoT devices, connected them to a laboratory network at CITP, and monitored the traffic that these devices exchanged with the public Internet.
In the debate over government "exceptional access" to encrypted communications, opponents with a technical bent (and that includes me) have said that it won't work: that such a scheme would inevitably lead to security problems. The response -- from the policy side, not from technical folk - has been to assert that perhaps more effort would suffice. FBI Director James Comey has said, "But my reaction to that is: I'm not sure they've really tried." Hillary Clinton wants a "Manhattan-like project, something that would bring the government and the tech communities together". More effort won't solve the problem - but the misunderstanding lies at the heart of why exceptional access is so hard.
The threat level has never been higher for organizations charged with protecting valuable data. In fact, as recent headlines will attest, no company or agency is completely immune to targeted attacks by persistent, skilled adversaries. The unprecedented success of these attacks against large and well-equipped organizations around the world has led many security executives to question the efficacy of traditional layered defenses as their primary protection against targeted attacks.
In the debate about "exceptional access" to encrypted conversations, law enforcement says they need such access to prevent and solve crimes; cryptographers, on the other hand, keep saying it's too complicated to do safely. That claim is sometimes met with skepticism: what's so hard about encryption? After all, you learn someone's key and just start encrypting, right? I wish it were that simple - but it's not.
On Nov. 30 and Dec. 1, 2015, some of the Internet's Domain Name System (DNS) root name servers received large amounts of anomalous traffic. Last week the root server operators published a report on the incident. In the interest of further transparency, I'd like to take this opportunity to share Verisign's perspective, including how we identify, handle and react, as necessary, to events such as this.