DNS Security

KSK Rollover, Elliptical Curve Vulnerabilities, Surveillance and Privacy. Are We Building Trust?

ICANN just recently performed a Root Zone DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Key Signing Key (KSK) Rollover. The recent KSK Rollover that took place on the 11th October 2018. The KSK Rollover has been successful and congratulations are in order. The Root Zone DNSSEC Key Signing Key "KSK" is the top most cryptographic key in the DNSSEC hierarchy. The KSK is a cryptographic public-private key pair. more

Call for Participation - ICANN DNSSEC Workshop at ICANN62, Panama City

Would you like to share information about how you are using DNSSEC with the wider technical community? Do you have an idea for how to make DNSSEC or DANE work better? Or work with new applications? If so - and if you will be attending ICANN 62 in Panama City, Panama from 25-28 June 2018 - then please consider sending in a proposal to participate as a speaker in the ICANN 62 DNSSEC Workshop! more

DNSSEC Workshop Streaming Live From ICANN 51 On Wednesday, Oct 15

Want to learn about the state of DNSSEC usage in North America? Or what is new in DNS monitoring? Or where DNSSEC fits into the plans of operating systems? Or how DANE is being used to bring a higher level of security to email? All those questions and much more will be discussed at the DNSSEC Workshop at ICANN 51 happening on Wednesday, October 15, 2014, from 8:30 am to 2:45 pm Pacific Daylight Time (PDT, which is UTC-7). more

Preparing DNSSEC for the Post-Quantum Era

To prepare DNS security for a post-quantum future, Verisign and partners are testing new cryptographic strategies that balance security, performance, and feasibility, especially through the novel Merkle Tree Ladder mode for managing large signatures. more

DNSSEC Root Signature, Almost There!

IT security specialists have known for years that the plain DNS is not to be trusted. Any hope for improvement rests on the DNSSEC protocol deployment. In this post, I will review the current status in one critical aspect, namely the DNS root signature key management. The other two foremost are the application usage of DNSSEC protocol functionality and the operational front, or the extent of deployment in the DNS infrastructure. The operational front includes the support by the DNS root nameservers, but my focus on signature key management leaves this issue aside. more

Verisign’s Role in Securing the DNS Through Key Signing Ceremonies

Every few months, an important ceremony takes place. It's not splashed all over the news, and it's not attended by global dignitaries. It goes unnoticed by many, but its effects are felt across the globe. This ceremony helps make the internet more secure for billions of people. This unique ceremony began in 2010 when Verisign, ICANN and the U.S. Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration collaborated... more

A Great Collaborative Effort: Increasing the Strength of the Zone Signing Key for the Root Zone

A few weeks ago, on Oct. 1, 2016, Verisign successfully doubled the size of the cryptographic key that generates DNSSEC signatures for the internet's root zone. With this change, root zone DNS responses can be fully validated using 2048-bit RSA keys. This project involved work by numerous people within Verisign, as well as collaborations with ICANN, Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). more

NANOG 95: From Faster Fibre to Route Leaks, Operators Face Old Problems with New Tools

The NANOG 95 conference spotlighted breakthroughs in fibre optics, wireless technology, routing security, and quantum computing, offering a forward-looking assessment of internet infrastructure and its vulnerabilities, as reported by APNIC's Geoff Huston. more

Why More Registries Should Be Talking About DNS Security

I've been incredibly lucky in my time at Neustar to lead both the exceptional Registry and Security teams. While these divisions handle their own unique product and service offerings, it's clear that they have some obvious crossovers in their risks, opportunities and challenges. Having been closely involved in the strategy of both these teams, it strikes me that there is more we as Registry Operators and service providers can and should be doing to align the world of cybersecurity with that of domain names. more

Trusted Notifier Arrangements Require Trust: Why Unpacking Misunderstandings Around Trusted Notifiers Is Important for Dealing With DNS-related Abuse

Domain Name System (DNS) Operators (Registries and Registrars) receive notices asking them to take action on a wide range of alleged technical and content-related abuses. However, there is a fundamental question of when it is appropriate to act at the DNS level and the evaluation of whether the alleged abuse meets a sufficient threshold for action at the DNS level. Additionally, given the volume of abuses occurring on the internet, existing resources, mechanisms, and protocols available in-house to Operators are in many cases insufficient to address abuses in a timely fashion. more

Can We Really Blame DNSSEC for Larger-Volume DDoS attacks?

In its security bulletin, Akamai's Security Intelligence Response Team (SIRT) reported on abuse of DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) when mounting a volumetric reflection-amplification attack. This is not news, but I'll use this opportunity to talk a bit about whether there is a trade-off between the increased security provided by DNSSEC and increased size of DNS responses that can be leveraged by the attackers. more

Registry Lock - or EPP With Two Factor Authentication

For the last couple of years, the most common attack vector against the DNS system is the attack against the registrar. Either the attack is on the software itself using weaknesses in the code that could inject DNS changes into the TLD registry, or social engineering the registrar support systems and the attacker receives credentials that in turn allows the attacker to perform malicious changes in DNS. DNSSEC is the common security mechanism that protects the DNS protocol, but by using the registrar attack, any changes will result in a proper working DNS delegation. more

DNSSEC Activities at ICANN 57 in Hyderabad on 4-7 November 2016

Friday marks the beginning of the ICANN 57 meeting in Hyderabad, India. As per usual there will be a range of activities related to DNSSEC or DANE. Two of the sessions will be streamed live and will be recorded for later viewing. Here is what is happening. All times below are India Standard Time (IST), which is UTC+05:30. Please do join us for a great set of sessions about how we can work together to make the DNS more secure and trusted! more

First Root Zone DNSSEC KSK Ceremony

ICANN will hold the first Root Zone DNSSEC KSK Ceremony on Wednesday 2010-06-16 in Culpeper, VA, USA. ... Attendance within the key ceremony room itself will be limited to just those with an operational requirement to execute the ceremony. However, since this event has generated significant interest, we have made additional space available in an adjacent room for observers who wish to attend the event. more

Don’t Blame Open Recursives For DDoS Attacks and Why You Should Implement BCP38

There has been plenty of buzz and chatter on the Internet recently concerning a very large DDoS attack against CloudFlare, with coverage on their blog, the New York Times, and the BBC, among many others. While attacks of this nature are certainly nothing new, the scale of this attack was surprising, reported to hit 120Gbps. For a sense of scale, your average cable modem is only about 20Mbps, or about 0.016% of that bandwidth. more