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A small but intriguing paragraph in the VeriSign settlement says that ICANN gets to maintain the root zone. I thought they did now, but I guess VRSN does, following advice from ICANN. This has two and a half effects. The most obvious is political -- if ICANN rather than VRSN is distributing the root zone, it removes the symbolic significance of VeriSign's A root server. The second is DNSSEC key management. Until now, the contents of the root zone have been pretty boring, a list of names and IP addresses of name servers. If DNSSEC is deployed in the root, which is not unlikely in the next few months, ICANN rather than VeriSign will hold the crypto keys used to sign the root zone. If a tug of war develops, whoever holds the keys wins, since without the keys, you can't publish a new version of the root with changed or added records unless you publish your own competing set of keys and can persuade people to use them. more
There is an interesting note on the ITU Strategy and Policy Unit Newslog about Root Servers, Anycast, DNSSEC, WGIG and WSIS about a presentation to ICANN's GAC. (The GAC website appears to be offline or inaccessible today.) The interesting sentence is this: Lack of formal relationship with root server operators is a public policy issue relevant to Internet governance. It is stated that this is "wrong" and "not a way to solve the issues about who edits the [root] zone file." Let's look at that lack of a formal relationship... more
The recent announcement in eWeek titled "Feds Won't Let Go of Internet DNS" (slashdotted here) has some major internet policy implications. The short, careful wording appears to be more of a threat to ICANN than a power grab. In short, the US Department of Commerce's (DOC) National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) announced that it was not going to stop overseeing ICANN's changes to the DNS root. ...Of course, they have done next to nothing to support DNSSEC or other proposal for securing the DNS, but it sounds reassuring. The last sentence shows that the Bush administration shares the Clinton administration's lack of understanding of how the internet should evolve... more
In Part I of this article I set the stage for our discussion and overviewed the October 21st DDoS attacks on the Internet's 13 root name servers. In particular, I highlighted that the attacks were different this time, both in size and scope, because the root servers were attacked at the same time. I also highlighted some of the problems associated with the Domain Name System and the vulnerabilities inherent in BIND. Part II of this article takes our discussion to another level by critically looking at alternatives and best practices that can help solve the security problems we've raised. more
A flawed abuse-response system shifts costs from perpetrators to intermediaries, overwhelming enforcement. The Trusted Notifier Network seeks to realign incentives, curb low-quality reporting, and restore efficiency by embedding trust, accountability, and cost redistribution. more
ICANN invites proposals for its DNSSEC and Security Workshop at the ICANN85 Community Forum in March 2026, offering a platform for global experts to share insights on DNS, routing security, and emerging threats. more
As Internet governance fragments in 2026, authority shifts from open, multistakeholder forums to state-led security regimes, legal instruments, and alliance-based cooperation, challenging longstanding institutions and reshaping global norms through enforcement rather than consensus. more
Earlier this week, Poland’s new President, Karol Nawrocki, vetoed amendments to the Act on Assistance to Citizens of Ukraine, provoking debate over critical satellite connectivity. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Affairs Krzysztof Gawkowski warned that the veto “de facto switched off Starlink for Ukraine,” potentially disrupting connectivity for hospitals, schools, and government operations. more
At the 20th Internet Governance Forum in Lillestrøm, Norway, the UN Internet Governance Forum's dynamic coalition Internet Standards, Security and Safety (IS3C) released its new report on post-quantum policies. This report presents the findings of a collaborative study undertaken by IS3C and the French domain name registry Afnic and examines the critical need for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to achieve greater security in the ever-expanding global IoT landscape. more
At the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) 2024 in Riyadh, the Internet Standards, Security and Safety Coalition (IS3C) released a new tool: 'To deploy or not to deploy, that's the question. How to convince your boss to deploy DNSSEC and RPKI'. In this report, IS3C advocates mass deployment of these two newer generation, security-related internet standards, as their deployment contributes significantly to the safety and security of all internet users. more
I recently appeared on the 419 Consulting podcast to discuss the European Union's NIS 2.0 Directive and its impact on the domain name ecosystem. I encourage all TLD registries, domain name registration service providers, and DNS operators to listen to the recording of that session which Andrew Campling has made available. more
As a member of the ROW Planning Committee, I am writing this post on behalf of the Committee and welcome all community members to join us on June 4th. We are celebrating ROW's 10th anniversary! A decade of collaboration and inspiration! Thank you to the incredible community that has fueled this journey! more
The Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) leads the charge to combat child sexual abuse material (CSAM) online, and we at Public Interest Registry (PIR) are dedicated to supporting their efforts. We are honored to work with them across two important programs: Domain Alerts and TLD Hopping List. IWF services have been extremely successful in addressing CSAM on .ORG over the past five years more
From the creation of DNSAI Compass ("Compass"), we knew that measuring DNS Abuse1 would be difficult and that it would be beneficial to anticipate the challenges we would encounter. With more than a year of published reports, we are sharing insights into one of the obstacles we have faced. One of our core principles is transparency and we've worked hard to provide this with our methodology. more
In cooperation with the ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC), we are planning a DNSSEC and Security Workshop for the ICANN78 Annual General Meeting being held as a hybrid meeting from 21-26 October 2023 in Hamburg, Germany in the Central European Summer Time Zone (UTC +2). This workshop date will be determined once ICANN creates a block schedule for us to follow; then we will be able to request a day and time. more